On the effectiveness of foreign aid in institutional quality
We extend the Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB) debate on ‘the effect of foreign aid on corruption’ by: not partially negating the former’s methodological underpinning (as in the latter’s approach) with a unifying empirical framework and; broadening the horizon of inquiry from corruption to eight institutional quality dynamics (rule of law, regulation quality, government effectiveness, democracy, corruption, voice & accountability, control of corruption and political stability). Core to this extension is a hypothetical contingency of the ‘institutional perils of foreign aid’ on existing institutional quality such that, the institutional downside of development assistance maybe questionable when greater domestic institutional development has taken place. Based on the hypothesis of institutional thresholds for foreign aid effectiveness, the perilous character of development assistance to institutional quality is broadly confirmed in 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010.
|Date of creation:||08 Feb 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Simplice A, Asongu, 2012.
"On the effect of foreign aid on corruption,"
36545, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & La Porta, Rafael & Shleifer, Andrei, 2008.
"The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins,"
2962610, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alesina, Alberto & Dollar, David, 2000.
" Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?,"
Journal of Economic Growth,
Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 33-63, March.
- Alberto Alesina & David Dollar, 1998. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," NBER Working Papers 6612, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dollar, David & Alesina, Alberto, 2000. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," Scholarly Articles 4553020, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Simplice A, Asongu, 2012.
"Fighting corruption in Africa: do existing corruption-control levels matter?,"
36900, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Simplice A. Asongu, 2012. "Fighting corruption in Africa: do existing corruption-control levels matter?," International Journal of Development Issues, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 12(1), pages 36-52, February.
- Asongu Simplice, 2012. "Fighting corruption in Africa: do existing corruption-control levels matter?," Working Papers 12/012, African Governance and Development Institute..
- Paul Mosley & John Hudson & Sara Horrell, 1992. "Aid, the public sector and the market in less developed countries: A return to the scene of the crime," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(2), pages 139-150, 03.
- Stephen Knack, 2001. "Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross-Country Empirical Tests," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 310-329, October.
- Asongu Simplice, 2011.
"Law, Democracy and the Quality of Government in Africa,"
11/018, African Governance and Development Institute..
- Simplice A, Asongu, 2011. "Law, democracy and the quality of government in Africa," MPRA Paper 35502, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Svensson, Jakob, 1998.
"Foreign aid and rent-seeking,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
1880, The World Bank.
- Alberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, 1999.
"Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?,"
NBER Working Papers
7108, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Simplice A, Asongu, 2012.
"Government quality determinants of stock market performance in African countries,"
39631, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Asongu Simplice, 2011. "Government Quality Determinants of Stock Market Performance in African Countries," Working Papers 11/019, African Governance and Development Institute..
- Okada, Keisuke & Samreth, Sovannroeun, 2011.
"The effect of foreign aid on corruption: A quantile regression approach,"
27969, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Okada, Keisuke & Samreth, Sovannroeun, 2012. "The effect of foreign aid on corruption: A quantile regression approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 240-243.
- Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1995. "Institutions And Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 207-227, November.
- Billger, Sherrilyn M. & Goel, Rajeev K., 2009. "Do existing corruption levels matter in controlling corruption?: Cross-country quantile regression estimates," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 299-305, November.
- Roger Koenker & Kevin F. Hallock, 2001.
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 143-156, Fall.
- Martin MÃ¼hleisen & Dhaneshwar Ghura & Roger Nord & Michael T. Hadjimichael & E. Murat Ucer, 1995. "Sub-Saharan Africa: Growth, Savings, and Investment, 1986-93," IMF Occasional Papers 118, International Monetary Fund.
- Boone, Peter, 1996. "Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 289-329, February.
- Kodila Tedika, Oasis, 2013.
"Anatomy of corruption Democratic Republic of Congo
[Anatomie de la Corruption en République Démocratique du Congo]," MPRA Paper 43463, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kodila Tedika, Oasis, 2012.
"Empirical Survey on the Causes of the Corruption
[Aperçu empirique sur les causes de la corruption]," MPRA Paper 41484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Rajeev K. Goel & Michael A. Nelson, 2005. "Economic Freedom Versus Political Freedom: Cross-Country Influences On Corruption ," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 121-133, 06.
- Pedersen, Karl R, 1996. " Aid, Investment and Incentives," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 98(3), pages 423-38.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:46649. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.