IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Taxation, corruption and the exchange rate regime

Listed author(s):
  • Hefeker, Carsten

The paper analyzes the relation between institutional quality, such as corruption, in a country and its monetary regime. It is shown that a credibly fixed exchange rate to a low inflation country, like a currency board, can reduce corruption and improve the fiscal system. A monetary union, however, has ambiguous effects. I find that there is convergence between countries with regard to the level of corruption.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48222/1/66401769X.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI) in its series HWWI Research Papers with number 2-12.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2008
Handle: RePEc:zbw:hwwirp:2-12
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Heimhuder Str. 71, D-20148 Hamburg

Phone: +49 (0)40 34 05 76 - 0
Fax: +49 (0)40 34 05 76 - 776
Web page: http://www.hwwi.org/en/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
  2. Rafael Di Tella & Alberto Ades, 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September.
  3. Demertzis, Maria & Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Viegi, Nicola, 2004. "An independent central bank faced with elected governments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 907-922, November.
  4. John Thornton & Fabian Bornhorst & Sanjeev Gupta, 2008. "Natural Resource Endowments, Governance, and the Domestic Revenue Effort; Evidence from a Panel of Countries," IMF Working Papers 08/170, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andres, 1995. "Fixed Versus Flexible Exchange Rates: Which Provides More Fiscal Discipline," Working Papers 95-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  6. F. Berkhout, 1999. "Essay," Energy & Environment, , vol. 10(2), pages 209-212, March.
  7. Brender, Adi & Drazen, Allan, 2005. "Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1271-1295, October.
  8. Stanley Fischer & Ratna Sahay & Carlos A. Vegh, 2002. "Modern Hyper- and High Inflations," NBER Working Papers 8930, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-286, March.
  10. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Reinhart, Carmen & Calvo, Guillermo, 2002. "Fear of floating," MPRA Paper 14000, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Catao, Luis A.V. & Terrones, Marco E., 2005. "Fiscal deficits and inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 529-554, April.
  13. Lane, Philip R & Tornell, Aaron, 1996. "Power, Growth, and the Voracity Effect," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 213-241, June.
  14. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2004. "The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(1), pages 1-48.
  15. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & Pablo Querubin & James A. Robinson, 2008. "When Does POlicy Reform Work? The Case of Central Bank Independence," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 39(1 (Spring), pages 351-429.
  16. Rudiger Ahrend & William Tompson, 2006. "Realising the Oil Supply Potential of the CIS: The Impact of Institutions and Policies," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 484, OECD Publishing.
  17. Toke S. Aidt, 2003. "Economic analysis of corruption: a survey," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(491), pages 632-652, November.
  18. Robin Brooks & Kenneth Rogoff & Ashoka Mody & Nienke Oomes & Aasim M. Husain, 2004. "Evolution and Performance of Exchange Rate Regimes," IMF Occasional Papers 229, International Monetary Fund.
  19. Stanley Fischer & Ratna Sahay & Carlos A. Végh Gramont, 2002. "Modern Hyper- and High Inflations," IMF Working Papers 02/197, International Monetary Fund.
  20. Vladimir Chaplygin & Andrew Hughes Hallett & Christian Richter, 2006. "Monetary integration in the ex-Soviet Union: A 'union of four'? ," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 14(1), pages 47-68, 03.
  21. de Kock, Gabriel & Grilli, Vittorio, 1993. "Fiscal Policies and the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(417), pages 347-358, March.
  22. Christopher W. Crowe, 2006. "Inflation, Inequality, and Social Conflict," IMF Working Papers 06/158, International Monetary Fund.
  23. Isard,Peter, 2005. "Globalization and the International Financial System," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521605076, December.
  24. Keith Blackburn & Kyriakos C. Neanidis & M. Emranul Haque, 2008. "Corruption, Seigniorage and Growth: Theory and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 2354, CESifo Group Munich.
  25. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, And Independance: Theory And Evidence," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 1-10, December.
  26. Al-Marhubi, Fahim A., 2000. "Corruption and inflation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 199-202, February.
  27. Christopher Meissner & Nienke Oomes, 2006. "Why Do Countries Peg the Way They Peg? The Determinants of Anchor Currency Choice," WEF Working Papers 0009, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London.
  28. Siklos,Pierre L., 2006. "The Changing Face of Central Banking," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521034494, December.
  29. Isard,Peter, 2005. "Globalization and the International Financial System," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521843898, December.
  30. Jeffrey A. Frankel, 1999. "No Single Currency Regime is Right for All Countries or At All Times," NBER Working Papers 7338, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  31. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andes, 1992. "The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1208-1231, December.
  32. Huang, Haizhou & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2005. "Monetary Policies for Developing Countries: The Role of Institutional Quality," CEPR Discussion Papers 4911, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  33. Frederick van der Ploeg, 2008. "Challenges and Opportunities for Resource Rich Economies," OxCarre Working Papers 005, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
  34. Alberto Alesina & Alexander Wagner, 2003. "Choosing (And Reneging On) Exchange Rate Regimes," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2008, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  35. Aasim M. Husain & Ashoka Mody & Nienke Oomes & Robin Brooks & Kenneth Rogoff, 2003. "Evolution and Performance of Exchange Rate Regimes," IMF Working Papers 03/243, International Monetary Fund.
  36. Carlos A. Végh, 1989. "Government Spending and Inflationary Finance: A Public Finance Approach," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 36(3), pages 657-677, September.
  37. Nienke Oomes & Christopher M. Meissner, 2008. "Why Do Countries Peg the Way They Peg? The Determinants of Anchor Currency Choice," IMF Working Papers 08/132, International Monetary Fund.
  38. Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo & Sturzenegger, Federico, 2005. "Classifying exchange rate regimes: Deeds vs. words," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1603-1635, August.
  39. Kenen,Peter B. & Meade,Ellen E., 2008. "Regional Monetary Integration," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521862509, December.
  40. Alex Cukierman & Sebastian Edwards & Guido Tabellini, 1989. "Seigniorage and Political Instability," NBER Working Papers 3199, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  41. Ari Aisen & Francisco José Veiga, 2005. "The Political Economy of Seigniorage," NIPE Working Papers 12/2005, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
  42. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Rules and Discretion with Noncoordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(4), pages 619-630, October.
  43. Michael Sturm & Nikolaus Siegfried, 2005. "Regional monetary integration in the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council," Occasional Paper Series 31, European Central Bank.
  44. Velasco, Andres, 1996. "Fixed exchange rates: Credibility, flexibility and multiplicity," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 1023-1035, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:hwwirp:2-12. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.