Does the fight against corruption require international cooperation?
This paper explores the role of corruption in a two-country model with fiscal spillovers. In the absence of cooperation on governance issues, countries always have a strategic incentive to appoint policymakers whose aversion to corruption is lower than average. An international agreement is a precondition for placing corruption fighters at the head of governments.
|Date of creation:||03 May 2011|
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