Does the fight against corruption require international cooperation?
This paper explores the role of corruption in a two-country model with fiscal spillovers. In the absence of cooperation on governance issues, countries always have a strategic incentive to appoint policymakers whose aversion to corruption is lower than average. An international agreement is a precondition for placing corruption fighters at the head of governments.
|Date of creation:||03 May 2011|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00610523|
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- Carsten Hefeker, 2010.
"Taxation, corruption and the exchange rate regime,"
Journal of Macroeconomics,
Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 338-346, March.
- Hefeker, Carsten, 2008. "Taxation, corruption and the exchange rate regime," HWWI Research Papers 2-12, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).
- Carsten Hefeker, 2009. "Taxation, Corruption and the Exchange Rate Regime," CESifo Working Paper Series 2561, CESifo Group Munich.
- Hefeker, Carsten, 2008. "Taxation, Corruption and the Exchange Rate Regime," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Zurich 2008 17, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
- Carsten Hefeker, 2009. "Taxation, Corruption and the Exchange Rate Regime," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200911, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Huang, Haizhou & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2006. "Monetary policies for developing countries: The role of institutional quality," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 239-252, September.
- Huang, Haizhou & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2005. "Monetary Policies for Developing Countries: The Role of Institutional Quality," CEPR Discussion Papers 4911, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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