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Choosing (and reneging on) exchange rate regimes

  • Alberto Alesina
  • Alexander Wagner

We use data on announced and actual exchange rate arrangements to ask which countries follow de facto regimes different from their de iure ones, that is, do not do what they say. Our results suggest that countries with poor institutional quality have difficulty in maintaining pegging and abandon it more often. In contrast, countries with relatively good institutions display fear of floating, i.e. they manage more than announced, perhaps to signal their differences from those countries incapable of maintaining promises of monetary stability.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 9809.

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Date of creation: Jun 2003
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Publication status: published as Alberto Alesina & Alexander F. Wagner, 2006. "Choosing (and Reneging on) Exchange Rate Regimes," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(4), pages 770-799, 06.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9809
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