IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Exploring different views of exchange rate regime choice

  • Carmignani, Fabrizio
  • Colombo, Emilio
  • Tirelli, Patrizio

The empirical distinction between de facto and de jure exchange rate regimes raises a number of interesting questions. Which factors may induce a de facto peg? Why do countries enforce a peg but do not announce it? Why do countries "break their promises"? We show that a stable socio-political environment and an efficient political decision-making process are a necessary prerequisite for choosing a peg and sticking to it, challenging the view that sees the exchange rate as a commitment device. Policymakers seem rather concerned with regime sustainability in the face of adverse economic and socio-political fundamentals.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V9S-4SRW0YJ-1/2/29f11072217e087c078a8b7152137496
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Money and Finance.

Volume (Year): 27 (2008)
Issue (Month): 7 (November)
Pages: 1177-1197

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:27:y:2008:i:7:p:1177-1197
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30443

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Alberto Alesina & Alexander Wagner, 2003. "Choosing (and reneging on) exchange rate regimes," NBER Working Papers 9809, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Leonardo Bartolini & Allan Drazen, 1996. "Capital Account Liberalization as a Signal," NBER Working Papers 5725, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Sébastien Wälti, 2005. "The duration of fixed exchange rate regimes," Trinity Economics Papers 2000518, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
  5. Philippe Aghion & Philippe Bacchetta & Romain Ranciere & Kenneth Rogoff, 2006. "Exchange Rate Volatility and Productivity Growth: The Role of Financial Development," NBER Working Papers 12117, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2004. "The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(1), pages 1-48, February.
  7. Chang, R. & Velasco, A., 1999. "Liquidity Crises in Emerging Markets: Theory and Policy," Working Papers 99-14, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  8. Bruno, Michael & Easterly, William, 1998. "Inflation crises and long-run growth," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 3-26, February.
  9. Hoyt Bleakley & Kevin Cowan, 2005. "Corporate Dollar Debt and Depreciations: Much Ado about Nothing?," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6693, Inter-American Development Bank.
  10. Andres Velasco & Alejandro Neut, 2003. "Tough Policies, Incredible Policies?," NBER Working Papers 9932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Giavazzi, Francesco & Pagano, Marco, 1986. "The Advantages of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility," CEPR Discussion Papers 135, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Broz, J. Lawrence, 2002. "Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(04), pages 861-887, September.
  13. Paul R. Masson & Allan Drazen, 1994. "Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers," IMF Working Papers 94/49, International Monetary Fund.
  14. Barry Eichengreen & Ricardo Hausmann, 1999. "Exchange rates and financial fragility," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 329-368.
  15. David Cook & Woon Gyu Choi, 2002. "Liability Dollarization and the Bank Balance Sheet Channel," IMF Working Papers 02/141, International Monetary Fund.
  16. Guillermo A. Calvo & Carmen M. Reinhart, 2000. "Fear of Floating," NBER Working Papers 7993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Stanley Fischer, 2001. "Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Bipolar View Correct?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 3-24, Spring.
  18. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2004. "Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 25-45, March.
  19. Aghion, Philippe & Bacchetta, Philippe & Banerjee, Abhijit, 2001. "A Corporate Balance Sheet Approach to Currency Crises," CEPR Discussion Papers 3092, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  20. Allan Drazen, 1997. "Policy Signaling in the Open Economy: A Re-Examination," NBER Working Papers 5892, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Rizzo, Jean-Marc, 1998. "The economic determinants of the choice of an exchange rate regime: a probit analysis," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 283-287, June.
  22. Klein, Michael W. & Marion, Nancy P., 1997. "Explaining the duration of exchange-rate pegs," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 387-404, December.
  23. Dornbusch, Rudiger & Fischer, Stanley, 1993. "Moderate Inflation," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 7(1), pages 1-44, January.
  24. Ricardo Hausmann & Ugo Panizza & Ernesto H. Stein, 2000. "Why Do Countries Float the Way They Float?," Research Department Publications 4205, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  25. Ari Aisen, 2004. "Money-Based Versus Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization; Is there Space for Political Opportunism?," IMF Working Papers 04/94, International Monetary Fund.
  26. Carmignani, Fabrizio, 2002. "New Evidence on the Politics and Economics of Multiparty Cabinets Duration," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 49(3), pages 249-79, August.
  27. Bernhard, William & Leblang, David, 1999. "Democratic Institutions and Exchange-rate Commitments," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(01), pages 71-97, December.
  28. Agell, Jonas & Calmfors, Lars & Jonsson, Gunnar, 1996. "Fiscal policy when monetary policy is tied to the mast," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(7), pages 1413-1440, August.
  29. Hélène Poirson, 2001. "How Do Countries Choose their Exchange Rate Regime?," IMF Working Papers 01/46, International Monetary Fund.
  30. Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini & Gerald D. Cohen, 1997. "Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510944, June.
  31. Helge Berger & Jan-Egbert Sturm & Jakob de Haan, 2000. "An Empirical Investigation into Exchange Rate Regime Choice and Exchange Rate Volatility," CESifo Working Paper Series 263, CESifo Group Munich.
  32. Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Jean-Marc Rizzo, 2002. "The viability of fixed exchange rate commitments: does politics matter? A theoretical and empirical investigation," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/8392, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  33. Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Jean-Marc Rizzo, 2002. "The Viability of Fixed Exchange Rate Commitments: Does Politics Matter? A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 111-132, April.
  34. Driffill, John & Miller, Marcus, 1993. "Learning and Inflation Convergence in the ERM," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(417), pages 369-78, March.
  35. S. Brock Blomberg & Jeffry Frieden & Ernesto Stein, 2005. "Sustaining fixed rates: The political economy of currency pegs in Latin America," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 203-225, November.
  36. Galindo, Arturo & Panizza, Ugo & Schiantarelli, Fabio, 2003. "Debt composition and balance sheet effects of currency depreciation: a summary of the micro evidence," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 330-339, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:27:y:2008:i:7:p:1177-1197. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.