Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers: Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique: Comment
We demonstrate that in important cases Propositions 3 and 4 in Eijffinger, Hoeberichts, and Schaling (2000) may fail. Moreover, their monetary policy delegation arrangement, which advocates that central banker preference uncertainty may be desirable, is dominated by other arrangements without any such uncertainty. Finally, their way of modelling preference uncertainty leads to arbitrary effects on average monetary policy. Without these, preference uncertainty is never desirable.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 35 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:35:y:2003:i:1:p:129-36. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.