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Monetary Policy Facing Fiscal Indiscipline under Generalized Timing of Actions

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  • Jan Libich
  • Petr Stehlík

Abstract

The paper analyzes interactions between monetary and fiscal policies, both in a single-country and in a monetary-union setting. As the policy interactions are strategic, we use game-theoretic methods. Specifically, we develop a framework that allows for an arbitrary, possibly stochastic timing of moves. Our analysis identifies a number of institutional and policy variables that influence the interplay and outcomes of monetary and fiscal policies, such as the average levels of inflation and debt, and that determine the likelihood of an unpleasant monetarist arithmetic. We then calibrate the model with European Monetary Union data.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Libich & Petr Stehlík, 2012. "Monetary Policy Facing Fiscal Indiscipline under Generalized Timing of Actions," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(3), pages 393-431, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201209)168:3_393:mpffiu_2.0.tx_2-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Libich, Jan, 2009. "A Note On The Anchoring Effect Of Explicit Inflation Targets," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(5), pages 685-697, November.
    2. Melecky, Ales & Melecky, Martin, 2014. "The Checks of Czechs: Optimizing the Debt Portfolio of the Czech Government," MPRA Paper 57604, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Libich, Jan & Nguyen, Dat Thanh & Stehlík, Petr, 2015. "Monetary exit and fiscal spillovers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PA), pages 184-206.
    4. Adam Geršl & Martina Jašová & Jan Zápal, 2014. "Fiscal Councils and Economic Volatility," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 64(3), pages 190-212, June.
    5. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Mavrodimitrakis, Christos, 2019. "Cooperation vs. leadership in a core-periphery monetary union: Inter-country vs. inter-institutional policy coordination," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 103-122.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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