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Central Bank Performance under Inflation Targeting

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  • Marc-André Gosselin

Abstract

The inflation targeting (IT) regime is 17 years old. With practice of IT now in more than 21 countries, there is enough evidence gathered to take stock of the IT experience. In this paper, we analyze the inflation record of IT central banks. We extend the work of Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel (2004) by looking at a broad range of factors that can influence inflation target deviations and by identifying the empirical determinants of successful monetary policy under IT. We find that part of the cross-country and time variation in inflation deviations from targets can be explained by exchange rate movements, fiscal deficits, and differences in financial sector development. With respect to the components of the IT framework, we find that a higher inflation target and a larger inflation control range are associated with more variable inflation (and output) outcomes. Although the literature tends to suggest that greater central bank transparency is desirable, our findings imply that transparency might be associated with less satisfactory inflation performance. Interestingly, central banks using economic models do a better job of stabilizing inflation around the target and output around trend.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc-André Gosselin, 2007. "Central Bank Performance under Inflation Targeting," Staff Working Papers 07-18, Bank of Canada.
  • Handle: RePEc:bca:bocawp:07-18
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Creel, Jérôme & Hubert, Paul, 2015. "Has Inflation Targeting Changed The Conduct Of Monetary Policy?," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, pages 1-21.
    2. Sweidan, Osama D., 2011. "Inflation variability between central bank's preferences and the structure of the economy: A note," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 630-636, January.
    3. de Mendonça, Helder Ferreira & de Guimarães e Souza, Gustavo José, 2012. "Is inflation targeting a good remedy to control inflation?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, pages 178-191.
    4. Mohammed SAIFUL ISLAM & Mohammad Taslim UDDIN, 2011. "Inflation Targeting as the Monetary Policy Framework: Bangladesh Perspective," Economia. Seria Management, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 14(1), pages 106-119, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central bank research; Inflation targets; Monetary policy framework;

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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