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Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games

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  • Irene Valsecchi

Abstract

For strategic communication games à la Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica 50:1431–1451, 1982 ) the paper shows that under some prior beliefs different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality. Hence, there can be different equilibrium action profiles with the same size. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(1), pages 31-53, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:74:y:2013:i:1:p:31-53
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-012-9326-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stephen Morris, 2001. "Political Correctness," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 231-265, April.
    2. Irene Valsecchi, 2009. "Non-Uniqueness of Equilibria in One-Shot Games of Strategic Communication," Working Papers 2009.19, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. Chen, Ying, 2011. "Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 401-424, March.
    4. Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter Norman, 2006. "Professional advice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 120-142, January.
    5. Prendergast, Canice & Stole, Lars, 1996. "Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(6), pages 1105-1134, December.
    6. Valsecchi, Irene, 2009. "Non-Uniqueness of Equilibria in One-Shot Games of Strategic Communication," Sustainable Development Papers 50404, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    7. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 2004. "The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 147-179, August.
    8. Ying Chen & Navin Kartik & Joel Sobel, 2008. "Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(1), pages 117-136, January.
    9. Marco Ottaviani & Francesco Squintani, 2006. "Naive audience and communication bias," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(1), pages 129-150, December.
    10. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    11. Wei Li, 2007. "Changing One's Mind when the Facts Change: Incentives of Experts and the Design of Reporting Protocols," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(4), pages 1175-1194.
    12. Farrell Joseph, 1993. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 514-531, October.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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