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Non-Uniqueness of Equilibria in One-Shot Games of Strategic Communication

Author

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  • Irene Valsecchi

    (University of Milano-Bicocca)

Abstract

The paper shows that Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique in the strategic communication game of Crawford and Sobel (1982). First, different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality, despite fixed prior beliefs. Hence, there can be different equilibrium action profiles with the same size. Second, provided a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists, different message rules and beliefs can hold in other equilibria inducing the same action profile.

Suggested Citation

  • Irene Valsecchi, 2009. "Non-Uniqueness of Equilibria in One-Shot Games of Strategic Communication," Working Papers 2009.19, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2009.19
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    Cited by:

    1. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(1), pages 31-53, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sender-Receiver Games; Strategic Information Transmission;

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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