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Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission

Author

Listed:
  • Mikhail Golosov
  • Vasiliki Skreta
  • Aleh Tsyvinski
  • Andrea Wilson

Abstract

This paper studies strategic information transmission in a dynamic environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision maker takes an action. Our main result is that, in contrast to a static environment, full information revelation is possible. The gradual revelation of information and the eventual full revelation is supported by the dynamic rewards and punishments. The construction of a fully revealing equilibrium relies on two key features. The first feature is that the expert is incentivized, via appropriate actions, to join separable groups in which she initially pools with far-away types, then later reveals her type. The second feature is the use of trigger strategies. The decision maker is incentivized by the reward of further information revelation if he chooses the separation-inducing actions, and the threat of a stop in information release if he does not. Our equilibrium is non-monotonic. With monotonic partition equilibria, full revelation is impossible.
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Suggested Citation

  • Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Working Papers 11-17, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ste:nystbu:11-17
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    File URL: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/economics/docs/workingpapers/2011/Skreta-DynamicStratInfoTrans,%20Sept2011.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Yuval Heller & Christoph Kuzmics, 2020. "Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values (Extended Version)," Papers 2005.05713, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
    2. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2012. "Communication and Learning," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 419-450.
    3. Hitoshi Sadakane, 2017. "Multistage Information Transmission with Voluntary Monetary Transfer," ISER Discussion Paper 1006rr, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jan 2018.
    4. Atakan, Alp & Koçkesen, Levent & Kubilay, Elif, 2020. "Starting small to communicate," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 265-296.
    5. Schottmüller, Christoph, 2019. "Too good to be truthful: Why competent advisers are fired," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 333-360.
    6. Frug, Alexander, 2018. "Strategic gradual learning and information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 594-615.
    7. Terstiege, Stefan & Wasser, Cédric, 2020. "Buyer-optimal extensionproof information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    8. Ambrus, Attila & Lu, Shih En, 2014. "Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 174-189.
    9. Peter Thompson & Jing Chen, 2011. "Disagreements, employee spinoffs and the choice of technology," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 14(3), pages 455-474, July.
    10. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2011. "How to talk to multiple audiences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 100-122, May.
    11. Anton Kolotilin, 2013. "Optimal Information Disclosure: Quantity vs. Quality," Discussion Papers 2013-19, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    12. Zeinab Aboutalebi & Ayush Pant, 2021. ""Believe ... and you are there". On Self-Confidence and Feedback," Working Papers 64, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    13. Hoffmann, Robert & Chesney, Thomas & Chuah, Swee-Hoon & Kock, Florian & Larner, Jeremy, 2020. "Demonstrability, difficulty and persuasion: An experimental study of advice taking," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    14. Hidir, Sinem, 2014. "Strategic Inaccuracy in Bargaining," TSE Working Papers 14-541, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    15. Kolb, Aaron & Conitzer, Vincent, 2020. "Crying about a strategic wolf: A theory of crime and warning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    16. Hitoshi Sadakane, 2017. "Multistage Information Transmission with Voluntary Monetary Transfer," ISER Discussion Paper 1006, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    17. Pak Hung Au, 2015. "Dynamic information disclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 791-823, October.
    18. Hitoshi Sadakane, 2017. "Multistage Information Transmission with Voluntary Monetary Transfer," ISER Discussion Paper 1006r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jun 2018.
    19. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5279 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Feddersen, Timothy & Gradwohl, Ronen, 2020. "Decentralized advice," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    21. Boleslavsky, Raphael & Lewis, Tracy R., 2016. "Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 110-134.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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