We examine the possibilities for communication between agents with divergent preferences in a noisy environment. Taking Crawford and Sobel's  (noiseless) communication game as a reference point, we study a model in which there is a probability epsilon in (0, 1) that the received message is a random draw from the entire message space, independent of the actual message sent by the sender. Just as in the CS model, we find that all equilibria are interval partitional; but unlike in CS, coding (the proportion of the message space used by any given set of types) is of critical importance. Via the appropriate coding scheme, one can construct equilibria that induce finitely many, a countable infinity or even an uncountable infinity of actions. Furthermore, for a given number of actions, there is typically a continuum of equilibria that induce that many actions. Surprisingly, the possibility of error can improve the prospects for communication. We show that for small noise levels there is a simple class of equilibria that are almost always welfare superior to the best CS equilibrium. There exists an optimal noise level for which these equilibria achieve the efficiency bound for general communication devices. Furthermore, for a range of biases introducing any amount of noise can be beneficial.
|Date of creation:||30 Apr 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 31 Buccleuch Place, EH8 9JT, Edinburgh|
Web page: http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Austen-Smith, David, 1994. "Strategic Transmission of Costly Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 955-63, July.
- Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 2004. "The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 147-179, August.
- Kartik, Navin & Ottaviani, Marco & Squintani, Francesco, 2007. "Credulity, lies, and costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 93-116, May.
- Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002.
"Long Cheap Talk,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp284, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
- Morgan, J. & Stocken, P., 1998.
"An Analysis of Stock Recommendations,"
204, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Forges, Francoise M, 1986.
"An Approach to Communication Equilibria,"
Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-85, November.
- F. Forges, 2010. "An Approach to Communication Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 516, David K. Levine.
- Forges, F., 1984. "An approach to communication equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 1984035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- FORGES, Françoise, . "An approach to communication equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP 721, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Olszewski, Wojciech, 2004. "Informal communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 180-200, August.
- Navin Kartik, 2005. "Information Transmission with Cheap and Almost-Cheap Talk," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000650, www.najecon.org.
- Goltsman, Maria & Hörner, Johannes & Pavlov, Gregory & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Mediation, arbitration and negotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1397-1420, July.
- Kovác, Eugen & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2009. "Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1373-1395, July.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:edn:esedps:167. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gina Reddie)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.