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An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism

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  • Susan Athey
  • Ilya Segal

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  • Susan Athey & Ilya Segal, 2013. "An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2463-2485, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:81:y:2013:i:6:p:2463-2485
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2008. "Contracting for information under imperfect commitment," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 905-925.
    2. Gershkov, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2009. "Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 36-68, January.
    3. Jonathan Levin, 2003. "Relational Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 835-857, June.
    4. William P. Rogerson, 1992. "Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 777-793.
    5. Reichelstein, Stefan, 1984. "Incentive compatibility and informational requirements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 32-51, October.
    6. Cheng Wang, 1995. "Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 577-595.
    7. David A. Miller, 2012. "Robust Collusion with Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 778-811.
    8. Athey, Susan & Miller, David A., 2007. "Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(3), September.
    9. Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2008. "Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 493-540, May.
    10. Battaglini, Marco, 2007. "Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 213-246, August.
    11. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2001. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1077-1098, July.
    12. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February.
    13. Myerson, Roger B, 1986. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-358, March.
    14. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    15. Claudio Mezzetti, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(5), pages 1617-1626, September.
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