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The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts

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  • Bourjade, Sylvain
  • Jullien, Bruno

Abstract

We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his reputation in the market for experts. The information the expert reveals decreases as his bias moves toward stronger preference for the status quo. We show that it is optimal to publicly disclose both the expert's contribution and his identity. Surprisingly, revealing the intensity of the expert's bias doesn't always improve the information he reveals in equilibrium. The presence of a second expert raises the first expert's incentives to report truthfully when reports are public, but reduces them when they are secret. In particular, having an option to call another expert may be detrimental in terms of information production if reports are not public. Finally, sequential consultation of experts reduces the information obtained when reports are public, but raises it when they are secret.

Suggested Citation

  • Bourjade, Sylvain & Jullien, Bruno, 2011. "The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts," MPRA Paper 34813, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:34813
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Ispano, 2013. "Information acquisition and the value of bad news," Working Papers 2013-36, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    2. Yves Oytana, 2014. "The Judicial Expert in a Two-Tier Hierarchy," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(3), pages 537-570, September.
    3. Ascensión Andina Díaz & José A. García-Martínez, 2016. "A careerist judge with two concerns," Working Papers 2016-02, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    4. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," EconomiX Working Papers 2016-23, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    5. repec:hit:hitjec:v:58:y:2017:i:2:p:89-106 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," Working Papers 2016-13, CRESE.
    7. repec:eee:jeborg:v:137:y:2017:i:c:p:37-53 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:eee:mateco:v:72:y:2017:i:c:p:112-121 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Midjord, Rune, 2012. "Competitive Pressure and Job Interview Lying: A Game Theoretical Analysis," DFAEII Working Papers 2012-14, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
    10. Hidir, Sinem, 2017. "Information Acquisition and Credibility in Cheap Talk," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 36, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    11. Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Decarolis, Francesco & Iossa, Elisabetta & Mollisi, Vincenzo & Giuffrida, Leonardo, 2016. "Buyer Quality and Procurement Outcomes: Explorative Evidence From the US," SITE Working Paper Series 41, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.
    12. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," Working Papers hal-01413908, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Experts; Bias; Reputation;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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