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Strategic Disclosure of Research Results: The Cost of Proving Your Honesty

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  • Emeric Henry

Abstract

In situations where a biased sender provides verifiable information to a receiver, I study how strategic reporting affects the incentives to search for information. Research provides series of signals that can be used selectively in reporting. I show that the sender is strictly worse off when his research effort is not observed by the receiver: he has to conduct more research than in the observable case and in equilibrium, discloses all the information he obtained. However this extra research can be socially beneficial and mandatory disclosure of results can thus be welfare reducing. Finally I identify cases where the sender withholds evidence and for which mandatory disclosure rules become more attractive. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.

Suggested Citation

  • Emeric Henry, 2009. "Strategic Disclosure of Research Results: The Cost of Proving Your Honesty," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(539), pages 1036-1064, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:119:y:2009:i:539:p:1036-1064
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ralph Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2011. "Learning More by Doing Less," Working Papers 2011-6, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    2. Jean-Philippe BONARDI & Olivier CADOT & Lionel COTTIER, 2016. "Extremists into Truth-tellers: Information Aggregation under Asymmetric Preferences," Working Papers P149, FERDI.
    3. Henry, Emeric & Ottaviani, Marco, 2017. "Research and the Approval Process: The Organization of Persuasion," CEPR Discussion Papers 11939, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Di Tillio, Alfredo & Ottaviani, Marco & Sørensen, Peter Norman, 2016. "Persuasion Bias in Science: Can Economics Help?," CEPR Discussion Papers 11343, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Sylvain Bourjade & Bruno Jullien, 2011. "The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 575-594, September.
    6. Yves Oytana, 2014. "The Judicial Expert in a Two-Tier Hierarchy," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(3), pages 537-570, September.
    7. Mike Felgenhauer & Elisabeth Schulte, 2014. "Strategic Private Experimentation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 74-105, November.
    8. Garret S. Christensen & Edward Miguel, 2016. "Transparency, Reproducibility, and the Credibility of Economics Research," NBER Working Papers 22989, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Abel Brodeur & Mathias Lé & Marc Sangnier & Yanos Zylberberg, 2016. "Star Wars: The Empirics Strike Back," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 1-32, January.
    10. Hedlund, Jonas, 2017. "Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 229-268.
    11. repec:eee:ecolet:v:163:y:2018:i:c:p:186-189 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Leppälä, Samuli, 2013. "Arrow's paradox and markets for nonproprietary information," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2013/2, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    13. Martin Gregor, 2014. "Receiver's access fee for a single sender," Working Papers IES 2014/17, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised May 2014.
    14. Martin Gregor, 2014. "Access fees for competing lobbies," Working Papers IES 2014/22, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2014.
    15. Herresthal, C., 2017. "Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1712, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    16. Gregor Martin, 2015. "To Invite or Not to Invite a Lobby, That Is the Question," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 143-166, July.
    17. Martin Gregor, 2011. "Corporate lobbying: A review of the recent literature," Working Papers IES 2011/32, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Nov 2011.
    18. Hedlund, Jonas, 2014. "Bayesian signaling," Working Papers 0577, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    19. Bralind Kiri & Nicola Lacetera & Lorenzo Zirulia, 2015. "Above a Swamp: A Theory of High-Quality Scientific Production," NBER Working Papers 21143, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Abel Brodeur & Mathias Lé & Marc Sangnier & Yanos Zylberberg, 2015. "Star Wars: The Empirics Strike Back," Working Papers halshs-01158500, HAL.
    21. Abel Brodeur & Mathias Lé & Marc Sangnier & Yanos Zylberberg, 2012. "Star wars: The empirics strike back," Working Papers halshs-00710122, HAL.
    22. Daniel Stone, 2011. "A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(3), pages 397-424, September.

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