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The Judicial Expert in a Two-Tier Hierarchy

Author

Listed:
  • Yves Oytana

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We study how the presence of biased expertise influences judicial decision-making. When an appeals-court judge's decision depends only on the information he gets about the expertise proceedings, a perfectly separating equilibrium may arise in which the losing litigant appeals only if the trial-court judge's decision is incorrect. Surprisingly enough, an increase in the probability that the expertise is biased and a decrease in the level of scrutiny of the appeals court may be beneficial. When the appeals-court judge uses a Bayesian mechanism to make his decision, a perfectly separating equilibrium never exists.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Yves Oytana, 2014. "The Judicial Expert in a Two-Tier Hierarchy," Post-Print hal-01410633, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01410633
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    Cited by:

    1. At Christian & Friehe Tim & Gabuthy Yannick, 2019. "On Lawyer Compensation When Appeals Are Possible," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(2), pages 1-11, April.
    2. Bertrand Chopard & Edwige Marion & Ludivine Roussey, 2014. "Does the Appeals Process Lower the Occurrence of Legal Errors?," EconomiX Working Papers 2014-43, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    3. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2018. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 67-107, August.
    4. Chopard Bertrand & Fain Edwige & Roussey Ludivine, 2018. "Does the Appeals Process Reduce the Occurrence of Legal Errors?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(2), pages 1-18, July.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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