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Lobbying in Antidumping

Author

Listed:
  • Gasmi, Farid
  • Malin, Eric
  • Tandé, François

Abstract

We analyze the interaction between a domestic firm and an international trade agency in charge of administering an antidumping procedure by means of a model in which dumping is viewed as an “aggressive” behavior of foreign firms against domestic firms of a relatively low-efficiency type. An informed and benevolent agency grants protection exclusively to this type of domestic firms. We introduce asymmetric information about the domestic firm's efficiency and let the agency's decision be influenced by the firm's choices of output and lobbying contribution. We characterize (pure-strategy) equilibria the properties of which shed some light on the way politics and economics interplay in antidumping, and perform a comparative statics analysis that highlights some of the benefits of reforming antidumping laws.
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Suggested Citation

  • Gasmi, Farid & Malin, Eric & Tandé, François, 2004. "Lobbying in Antidumping," IDEI Working Papers 320, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  • Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:3403
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brainard, S. Lael & Martimort, David, 1997. "Strategic trade policy with incompletely informed policymakers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 33-65, February.
    2. Moore, Michael O. & Suranovic, Steven M., 1992. "Lobbying vs. administered protection : Endogenous industry choice and national welfare," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3-4), pages 289-303, May.
    3. Wright, Donald J, 1998. "Strategic Trade Policy and Signalling with Unobservable Costs," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 105-119, February.
    4. Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2006. "Informational lobbying and political contributions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 631-656, May.
    5. Finger, J M & Hall, H Keith & Nelson, Douglas R, 1982. "The Political Economy of Administered Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 452-466, June.
    6. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    7. Maurizio Zanardi, 2004. "Antidumping law as a collusive device," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 37(1), pages 95-122, February.
    8. Rosendorff, B Peter, 1996. "Voluntary Export Restraints, Antidumping Procedure, and Domestic Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 544-561, June.
    9. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, January.
    10. Prusa, Thomas J., 1992. "Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1-2), pages 1-20, August.
    11. Brian Hindley & Patrick A. Messerlin, 1996. "Antidumping Industrial Policy," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 53532.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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