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In Google we trust?

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  • Burguet, Roberto
  • Caminal, Ramon
  • Ellman, Matthew

Abstract

We examine the incentives of a monopolistic search engine, funded by advertising, to provide reliable search results. We distinguish two types of search results: sponsored and organic (not-paid-for). Organic results are most important in searches for online content, while sponsored results are more important in product searches. By modeling the underlying markets for online content and offline products, we can identify the sources of distortions for each type of result, and their interaction. This explicit treatment proves crucial for understanding, not only spillovers across markets, but also fundamental policy issues, such as the welfare effects of integration. In particular, integration of the engine with a small fraction of content providers is welfare-enhancing when incentives to distort are stronger for sponsored than organic search, but welfare-reducing in the opposite case.

Suggested Citation

  • Burguet, Roberto & Caminal, Ramon & Ellman, Matthew, 2015. "In Google we trust?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 44-55.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:39:y:2015:i:c:p:44-55
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.02.003
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew Mitchell, 2021. "Free ad(vice): internet influencers and disclosure regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(1), pages 3-21, March.
    2. Alaoui, Larbi & Germano, Fabrizio, 2020. "Time scarcity and the market for news," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 173-195.
    3. Peitz, Martin & Reisinger, Markus, 2014. "The Economics of Internet Media," Working Papers 14-23, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    4. Chen, Yongmin, 2020. "Improving market performance in the digital economy," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    5. de Cornière, Alexandre & Sarvary, Miklos, 2020. "Social Media and News: Content Bundling and news Quality," TSE Working Papers 20-1152, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    6. Burguet, Roberto & Caminal, Ramon & Ellman, Matthew, 2015. "In Google we trust?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 44-55.
    7. Carlo Reggiani & Alejandro Saporiti & Lois Simanjuntak, 2018. "Social Information and Consumer Heterogeneity," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1813, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    8. Germano, Fabrizio & Sobbrio, Francesco, 2020. "Opinion dynamics via search engines (and other algorithmic gatekeepers)," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    9. Prüfer, Jens & Schottmuller, C., 2017. "Competing with Big Data," Other publications TiSEM b09cad5c-e6eb-4fe7-9184-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    10. Matthew Ellman & Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer, 2016. "Strategic grouping and search for quality journalism, online versus offline," Working Papers 16-21, NET Institute.
    11. Aridor, Guy & Gonçalves, Duarte, 2022. "Recommenders’ originals: The welfare effects of the dual role of platforms as producers and recommender systems," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    12. Matthew Mitchell, 2018. "Free (Ad)vice," 2018 Meeting Papers 1194, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    13. Yongmin Chen, 2024. "Search and Competition Under Product Quality Uncertainty," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(2), pages 633-661, June.
    14. Jan Krämer, & Daniel Schnurr,, 2018. "Is there a need for platform neutrality regulation in the EU?," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(7), pages 514-529.
    15. Marc Bourreau & Germain Gaudin, 2022. "Streaming platform and strategic recommendation bias," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 25-47, February.
    16. Jens Prüfer & Christoph Schottmüller, 2021. "Competing with Big Data," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(4), pages 967-1008, December.
    17. Paul Belleflamme & Martin Peitz, 2018. "Inside the Engine Room of Digital Platforms: Reviews, Ratings, and Recommendations," Working Papers halshs-01714549, HAL.
    18. Chen, Yongmin & Zhang, Tianle, 2018. "Intermediaries and consumer search," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 255-277.
    19. Bisceglia, Michele, 2023. "The unbundling of journalism," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    20. Hummel, Patrick, 2016. "Position auctions with dynamic resizing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 38-46.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Search engine bias; Internet economics; Vertical integration; Two-sided markets; Antitrust;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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