Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions
Download full text from publisher
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- M. Yenmez, 2014. "Pricing in position auctions and online advertising," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(1), pages 243-256, January.
- Emmanuel LORENZON, 2016. "Collusion with a Greedy Center in Position Auctions," Cahiers du GREThA 2016-08, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.
- Renato Gomes, 2014. "Optimal auction design in two-sided markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(2), pages 248-272, June.
- Emanuele Tarantino, 2012. "A Note on Vertical Search Engines’ Foreclosure," Chapters,in: Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation, chapter 8 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Yi Zhu & Kenneth C. Wilbur, 2011. "Hybrid Advertising Auctions," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 30(2), pages 249-273, 03-04.
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Choi, Syngjoo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2017. "An experimental study of sponsored-search auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 20-43.
- Gomes, Renato & Sweeney, Kane, 2014. "Bayes–Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 421-437.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2015.
"Optimal Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings,"
CIRJE-F-955, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2015. "Optimal Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings," CARF F-Series CARF-F-357, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Przemyslaw Jeziorski & Ilya Segal, 2015. "What Makes Them Click: Empirical Analysis of Consumer Demand for Search Advertising," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 24-53, August.
- Hummel, Patrick, 2016. "Position auctions with dynamic resizing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 38-46.
- Caragiannis, Ioannis & Kaklamanis, Christos & Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis & Kyropoulou, Maria & Lucier, Brendan & Paes Leme, Renato & Tardos, Éva, 2015. "Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 343-388.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
More about this item
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-01-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2010-01-23 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2010-01-23 (Game Theory)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hbs:wpaper:10-054. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Soebagio Notosoehardjo). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/harbsus.html .
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .