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Intermediaries and Consumer Search

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  • Chen, Yongmin
  • Zhang, Tianle

Abstract

This paper discusses how intermediaries, such as a search engine and an online marketplace, may affect consumer search. We propose an analytical framework that encompasses several models of search for differentiated products, with a high-quality firm being more likely to offer a product that meets each consumer's need. An intermediary improves consumer search efficiency by providing a search platform on which positions are sold to high-quality firms through competitive bidding. While the intermediary may admit too many or too few firms to its platform, compared to what would maximize consumer surplus or total welfare, its presence can nevertheless benefit consumers and improve welfare. However, the intermediary may reduce search efficiency when firms are differentiated only horizontally, when they sell experience or credence goods, or when the intermediary is biased (possibly due to vertical integration).

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Yongmin & Zhang, Tianle, 2016. "Intermediaries and Consumer Search," MPRA Paper 76051, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:76051
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Huang, Yangguang & Xie, Yu, 2023. "Search algorithm, repetitive information, and sales on online platforms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    2. Chen, Yongmin, 2020. "Improving market performance in the digital economy," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    3. Yangguang Huang, 2021. "Search Algorithm and Sales on Online Platforms: Evidence from Food Delivery Platforms," HKUST CEP Working Papers Series 202101, HKUST Center for Economic Policy.
    4. Roberto Burguet & Vaiva Petrikaite, 2017. "Targeted Advertising and Costly Consumer Search," Working Papers 971, Barcelona School of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    consumer search; intermediary; search engine; search platform; online marketplace; vertical differentiation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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