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Ordered Consumer Search

Listed author(s):
  • Armstrong, Mark

The paper discusses situations in which consumers search through their options in a deliberate order, in contrast to more familiar models with random search. Topics include: network effects (consumers may be better off following the same search order as other consumers); the use of price and non-price advertising to direct search; the impact of consumers starting a new search with their previous supplier; the incentive sellers have to merge or co-locate with other sellers; and the incentive a seller can have to raise its own search cost. I also show how ordered search can be reformulated as a simpler discrete choice problem without search frictions.

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File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72194/3/MPRA_paper_72194.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 72194.

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Date of creation: 24 Jun 2016
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:72194
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