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- Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus, 2010. "Competing Auctions," Staff General Research Papers Archive 32106, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg & Markus Mobius, 2010. "Competing Auctions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000092, David K. Levine.
- Glenn Allison & Drew Fudenberg, 2002. "Competing Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1960, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Ellison, Glenn & Mobius, Markus & Fudenberg, Drew, 2004. "Competing Auctions," Scholarly Articles 3043414, Harvard University Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2003.
"Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 118(4), pages 1249-1278.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2003. "Knife Edge of Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?," NBER Working Papers 9528, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Ellison, Glenn, 2003. "Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?," Scholarly Articles 3160493, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2003. "Knife-Edge or Plateau: When do Market Models Tip?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000098, David K. Levine.
- Gresik, Thomas A. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1989. "The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 304-332, June.
- Gehrig, Thomas, 1998. "Competing markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 277-310, February.
- Burguet, Roberto & Sakovics, Jozsef, 1999. "Imperfect Competition in Auction Designs," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 231-247, February.
- Tymon Tatur, 2000. "Asymptotically Optimal Market Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 1315, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, revised Jan 2001.
- Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2001. "Competing cybermediaries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 797-808, May.
- Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 1997.
"Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices,"
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Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 141-179, July.
- Michael Peters & Sergei Severinov, 1995. "Competition Among Sellers who offer Auctions Instead of Prices," Working Papers peters-95-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
More about this item
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
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