This paper shows that larger auctions are more efficient than smaller ones, but that despite this scale effect, two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium. We find that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the aggregate buyerâ€”seller ratio, and also whether the markets are especially thin.
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|Date of creation:||16 Nov 2010|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of the European Economic Association, March 2004, vol. 2 no. 1, pp. 30-66|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070|
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- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2003.
"Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 118(4), pages 1249-1278.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2003. "Knife Edge of Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?," NBER Working Papers 9528, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Ellison, Glenn, 2003. "Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?," Scholarly Articles 3160493, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2003. "Knife-Edge or Plateau: When do Market Models Tip?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000098, David K. Levine.
- Gresik, Thomas A. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1989. "The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 304-332, June.
- Gehrig, Thomas, 1998. "Competing markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 277-310, February.
- Burguet, Roberto & Sakovics, Jozsef, 1999. "Imperfect Competition in Auction Designs," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 231-247, February.
- Tymon Tatur, 2000. "Asymptotically Optimal Market Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 1315, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, revised Jan 2001.
- Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2001. "Competing cybermediaries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 797-808, May.
- Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 1997. "Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 141-179, July.
- Michael Peters & Sergei Severinov, 1995. "Competition Among Sellers who offer Auctions Instead of Prices," Working Papers peters-95-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
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