Ordered search in differentiated markets
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- Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose L. & Petrikaite, Vaiva, 2011. "Consumer search costs and the incentives to merge under Bertrand Competition," IESE Research Papers D/934, IESE Business School.
- Gamp, Tobias, 2015. "Search, Differentiated Products, and Obfuscation," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112886, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
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More about this item
KeywordsSearch Price dispersion Product differentiation;
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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