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Ideologues Beat Idealists

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  • Sambuddha Ghosh
  • Vinayak Tripathi

Abstract

Our model considers a majority election between two candidates—an ideologue committed to a fixed policy and an idealist who implements the ex post choice of the majority. Voters are aware that their individual rankings of policies may change after the election according to common or idiosyncratic shocks. We show that in equilibrium the ideologue often beats the idealist, even when this choice hurts all voters. Inefficiency arises both for sincere and for strategic voters; we also show that it is more pervasive in the latter case. Groups may be inflexible even when each individual has a preference for flexibility. (JEL C72, D72)

Suggested Citation

  • Sambuddha Ghosh & Vinayak Tripathi, 2012. "Ideologues Beat Idealists," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 27-49, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:4:y:2012:i:2:p:27-49
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.4.2.27
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Jianan Wang, 2021. "Evidence and fully revealing deliberation with non-consequentialist jurors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 515-531, December.
    3. Gratton, Gabriele, 2014. "Pandering and electoral competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 163-179.
    4. Jianan Wang, 2022. "Partially verifiable deliberation in voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(3), pages 457-481, March.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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