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Psychologische Restriktionen wirtschaftspolitischer Reformen

  • Friedrich Heinemann
  • Michael Förg
  • Eva Jonas
  • Eva Traut-Mattausch

Suggestions for economic policy reform are regularly confronted with the problem of lacking reform acceptance in the political process and among the general public. So far "Reformstau" is widely analysed as a consequence of collective action failures. In contrast to these approaches based on standard assumptions of rationality this contribution explores behavioral economics explanations. It is shown that prospect theory and related phenomena can help to understand reform resistance. Experimental evidence with respect to current German reform debates is presented which supports this view. Taking account of psychological reform obstacles is shown to be useful to derive reform and communication strategies. Copyright 2008 die Autoren Journal compilation 2008, Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Article provided by Verein für Socialpolitik in its journal Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik.

Volume (Year): 9 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 383-404

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Handle: RePEc:bla:perwir:v:9:y:2008:i:4:p:383-404
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