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Origins of reform resistance and the Southern European regime

Author

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  • Friedrich Heinemann

    (ZEW Mannheim, University of Heidelberg)

  • Theocharis Grigoriadis

    (Free University of Berlin)

Abstract

With a particular interest for Southern Europe, this contribution develops a classification of obstacles to economic policy reforms. This classification covers approaches ranging from classical economics and political-economic explanations to more innovative explanations linked to behavioral economics. The subsequent part analyzes qualitatively and quantitatively to which extent the “Southern European regime” may imply a particular relevance of some of the potential reform obstacles classified before. We derive “reform ability profiles” which quantify several of the reform obstacles (or reform drivers) to compare EU countries in their likely reform predisposition. These profiles confirm particular Southern European weaknesses which tend to reduce the political-economic feasibility of long-term reforms: a low effectiveness in poverty protection, high intertemporal discounting and uncertainty avoidance, a poor information level of the population and deeply shattered trust in national institutions. In a microeconometric analysis based on Eurobarometer survey data, the analysis leaves the highly aggregated level and looks into the individual heterogeneity in reform acceptance. It is shown that several of the reform obstacles identified in theory are also empirically correlated with the individual inclination to accept reforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Friedrich Heinemann & Theocharis Grigoriadis, 2016. "Origins of reform resistance and the Southern European regime," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 43(4), pages 661-691, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:empiri:v:43:y:2016:i:4:d:10.1007_s10663-016-9342-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s10663-016-9342-6
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    Cited by:

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    2. Markus Leibrecht & Joelle H. Fiong, 2017. "Economic Crises and Globalisation as Drivers of Pension Privatisation: an Empirical Analysis," ICMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance icma-dp2017-05, Henley Business School, University of Reading.
    3. Michael Böheim & Harald Oberhofer, 2016. "Special Issue: Challenges for Europe 2050: Selected papers of the EUROFRAME Conference 2015 and the WWWforEurope Project," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 43(4), pages 657-660, November.
    4. Leibrecht, Markus & Pitlik, Hans, 2015. "Social trust, institutional and political constraints on the executive and deregulation of markets," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 249-268.
    5. Hans Pitlik, 2017. "Österreich 2025 – Verwaltungsreform zwischen Effizienzstreben und Reformwiderständen. Ein Überblick," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 90(3), pages 205-217, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Behavioral economics; Eurobarometer; European debt crisis; Reform resistance; Trust;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • O52 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Europe

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