Eine Gabe an St. Nimmerlein?- Zur zeitlichen Dimension der Schuldenbremse
This paper analyzes the effectiveness of the tax and transfer systems in the European Union and the US to act as an automatic stabilizer in the current economic crisis. We consider two scenarios: a proportional income shock and a shock on employment which increases the rate of unemployment. We find that automatic stabilizers absorb 38 per cent of a proportional income shock in the EU, compared to 32 per cent in the US. In the case of an unemployment shock 48 per cent of the shock is absorbed in the EU, compared to 34 per cent in the US. Under the assumption that only credit constrained households adjust current spending on consumption goods to current disposable income, the cushioning of disposable income leads to a demand stabilization of 26 to 35 per cent in the EU and 19 per cent in the US. There is large heterogeneity within the EU. Automatic stabilizers in Eastern and Southern Europe are much lower than in Central and Northern European countries. With respect to income stabilization, Germany is above the European average for both scenarios. Demand stabilization in Germany is weaker because the number of liquidity constrained households is below the EU average. Copyright 2010 die Autoren. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik.
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Volume (Year): 11 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
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