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Political Polarization

Author

Listed:
  • Dixit, Avinash

    (Princeton University)

  • Weibull, Jörgen

    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

Failures of government policies often provoke opposite reactions from citizens; some call for a reversal of the policy while others favor its continuation in stronger form. We offer an explanation of such polarization, based on a natural bimodality of preferences in political and economic contexts, and consistent with Bayesian rationality.

Suggested Citation

  • Dixit, Avinash & Weibull, Jörgen, 2006. "Political Polarization," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 655, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 19 Apr 2007.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0655
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Michaeli, Moti & Wu, Jiabin, 2022. "Fighting polarization with (parental) internalization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 194(C), pages 124-138.
    2. Massimo Egidi, 2023. "The internal fragility of representative democracy: was Schumpeter right?," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 645-670, July.
    3. Dimant, Eugen & Galeotti, Fabio & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2024. "Motivated information acquisition and social norm formation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    4. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016. "Political disagreement and information in elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 390-412.
    5. Sgroi, Daniel & Yeo, Jonathan & Zhuo, Shi, 2021. "Ingroup Bias with Multiple Identities: The Case of Religion and Attitudes Towards Government Size," IZA Discussion Papers 14714, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Osuna Ramírez, Sergio Andrés & Veloutsou, Cleopatra & Morgan-Thomas, Anna, 2024. "On the antipodes of love and hate: The conception and measurement of brand polarization," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    7. Binswanger, Johannes & Prüfer, Jens, 2012. "Democracy, populism, and (un)bounded rationality," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 358-372.
    8. Jean-François Laslier & Jörgen Weibull, 2008. "Committee decisions: Optimality and Equilibrium," Working Papers halshs-00121741, HAL.
    9. Cheung, Man-Wah & Wu, Jiabin, 2018. "On the probabilistic transmission of continuous cultural traits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 300-323.
    10. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020. "How noise affects effort in tournaments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    11. Chang, Dongkyu & Vong, Allen, 2025. "Perverse ethical concerns: Misinformation and coordination," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    12. Bindewald, Eckart & Atallah, Shady S., 2017. "Achieving multiple goals via voluntary efforts and motivation asymmetry," Ecological Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 354(C), pages 37-48.
    13. Kim, Jonghoon & Jeong, Hyeong-Chai & Baek, Seung Ki, 2022. "Symmetric Nash equilibrium of political polarization in a two-party system," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 607(C).
    14. Fang, Ming & Lai, Weizheng & Xia, Congling, 2025. "Anti-corruption and political trust: Evidence from China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 234(C).
    15. Dodlova, Marina & Zudenkova, Galina, 2021. "Incumbents’ performance and political extremism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    16. Matthew I. Jones & Antonio D. Sirianni & Feng Fu, 2022. "Polarization, abstention, and the median voter theorem," Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 9(1), pages 1-12, December.
    17. Ceren Baysan, 2017. "Can More Information Lead to More Voter Polarization? Experimental Evidence from Turkey," 2017 Papers pba1551, Job Market Papers.
    18. Jeong, Daeyoung, 2019. "Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 50-80.
    19. Mithani, Murad A., 2024. "Nationalistic political rhetoric: measurement and preliminary insights," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2).
    20. Hermes, Henning & Lergetporer, Philipp & Mierisch, Fabian & Schwerdt, Guido & Wiederhold, Simon, 2024. "Information about inequality in early child care reduces polarization in policy preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
    21. Melki, Mickael & Pickering, Andrew, 2014. "Ideological polarization and the media," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 36-39.
    22. Kamphorst, Jurjen J.A. & Swank, Otto H., 2013. "When Galatea cares about her reputation: How having faith in your workers reduces their motivation to shine," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 91-104.
    23. Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Dubra, Juan, 2014. "A Theory of Rational Attitude Polarization," MPRA Paper 60129, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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