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Symmetric Nash equilibrium of political polarization in a two-party system

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  • Kim, Jonghoon
  • Jeong, Hyeong-Chai
  • Baek, Seung Ki

Abstract

The median-voter hypothesis (MVH) predicts convergence of two party platforms across a one-dimensional political spectrum during majoritarian elections. From the viewpoint of the MVH, an explanation of polarization is that each election has a different median voter so that a party cannot please all the median voters at the same time. We consider two parties competing to win voters along a one-dimensional spectrum and assume that each party nominates one candidate out of two in the primary election, for which the electorates represent only one side of the whole population. We argue that all the four candidates will come to the same distance from the median of the total population through best-response dynamics.

Suggested Citation

  • Kim, Jonghoon & Jeong, Hyeong-Chai & Baek, Seung Ki, 2022. "Symmetric Nash equilibrium of political polarization in a two-party system," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 607(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:607:y:2022:i:c:s0378437122007658
    DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2022.128207
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    References listed on IDEAS

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