IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cid/wpfacu/35.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Auctioning Conservation Contracts in Indonesia - Participant Learning in Multiple Trial Rounds

Author

Listed:
  • B Kelsey Jack

Abstract

This paper examines bid adjustments across multiple trial rounds to identify learning by participants in a procurement auction for conservation contracts in Indonesia. Outcomes from previous rounds show an effect on adjustment in subsequent rounds, which is significantly different from predictions under simulated random bidding. This pattern indicates systematic incorporation of information into bid formation, consistent with learning. Individual bidding variability decreases with repetition, consistent with the discovery of a common value component to the auctioned conservation contract. Implications for future implementation of conservation auctions in developing countries and directions for future research are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • B Kelsey Jack, 2009. "Auctioning Conservation Contracts in Indonesia - Participant Learning in Multiple Trial Rounds," CID Working Papers 35, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
  • Handle: RePEc:cid:wpfacu:35
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/cid/files/publications/fellow_graduate_student_working_papers/035-2.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jason F. Shogren & John A. List & Dermot J. Hayes, 2000. "Preference Learning in Consecutive Experimental Auctions," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1016-1021.
    2. Katherine Reichelderfer & William G. Boggess, 1988. "Government Decision Making and Program Performance: The Case of the Conservation Reserve Program," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 70(1), pages 1-11.
    3. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
    4. Dyer, Douglas & Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan, 1989. "A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory Analysis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(394), pages 108-115, March.
    5. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-881, September.
    6. Ronald G. Cummings & Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2004. "Using laboratory experiments for policymaking: An example from the Georgia irrigation reduction auction," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(2), pages 341-363.
    7. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2007. "Auctions and information acquisition: sealed bid or dynamic formats?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 355-372, June.
    8. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1995. "Consistency and cautious fictitious play," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(5-7), pages 1065-1089.
    9. Uwe Latacz-Lohmann & Carel Van der Hamsvoort, 1997. "Auctioning Conservation Contracts: A Theoretical Analysis and an Application," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 79(2), pages 407-418.
    10. Jason F. Shogren & Dermot J. Hayes & James B. Kliebenstein & John A. Fox, 1994. "Bid Sensitivity and the Structure of the Vickrey Auction," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 76(5), pages 1089-1095.
    11. John A. List & Jason F. Shogren, 1999. "Price Information and Bidding Behavior in Repeated Second-Price Auctions," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(4), pages 942-949.
    12. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number auction1.
    13. Stavins, Robert N., 2003. "Experience with market-based environmental policy instruments," Handbook of Environmental Economics, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 355-435, Elsevier.
    14. Ferraro, Paul J., 2008. "Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 810-821, May.
    15. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "The Theory of Learning in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, December.
    16. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2004. "The Wait-and-See Option in Ascending Price Auctions," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 494-503, 04/05.
    17. Arellano, Manuel, 2003. "Panel Data Econometrics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199245291.
    18. Atakelty Hailu & Steven Schilizzi, 2004. "Are Auctions More Efficient Than Fixed Price Schemes When Bidders Learn?," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 29(2), pages 147-168, December.
    19. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number auction1.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Skidmore, Samuel & Santos, Paulo & Leimona, Beria, 2014. "Targeting REDD+: An Empirical Analysis of Carbon Sequestration in Indonesia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 781-790.
    2. Ajayi, Oluyede C. & Jack, B. Kelsey & Leimona, Beria, 2012. "Auction Design for the Private Provision of Public Goods in Developing Countries: Lessons from Payments for Environmental Services in Malawi and Indonesia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 1213-1223.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Valle, Haydn & Capon, Timothy & Harris, Michael & Reeson, Andrew, 2012. "Coordination and Strategic Behaviour in Landscape Auctions," 2012 Conference (56th), February 7-10, 2012, Fremantle, Australia 124466, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    2. Schilizzi, Steven & Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe, 2009. "Predicting the performance of conservation tenders when information on bidders's costs is limited," 2009 Conference (53rd), February 11-13, 2009, Cairns, Australia 48171, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    3. Stoneham, Gary & O'Keefe, Andrew & Eigenraam, Mark & Bain, David, 2012. "Creating physical environmental asset accounts from markets for ecosystem conservation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 114-122.
    4. Rolfe, John & Windle, Jill, 2006. "Using Field Experiments to Explore the Use of Multiple Bidding Rounds in Conservation Auctions," Discussion Papers 25801, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    5. John Rolfe & Jill Windle & Juliana McCosker, 2009. "Testing and Implementing the Use of Multiple Bidding Rounds in Conservation Auctions: A Case Study Application," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 57(3), pages 287-303, September.
    6. Whitten, Stuart M. & Reeson, Andrew & Windle, Jill & Rolfe, John, 2013. "Designing conservation tenders to support landholder participation: A framework and case study assessment," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 6(C), pages 82-92.
    7. Ferraro, Paul J., 2008. "Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 810-821, May.
    8. Larry Samuelson, 2016. "Game Theory in Economics and Beyond," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 30(4), pages 107-130, Fall.
    9. Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
    10. Yan Chen & Peter Cramton & John A. List & Axel Ockenfels, 2021. "Market Design, Human Behavior, and Management," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5317-5348, September.
    11. Paulo Fagandini & Ingemar Dierickx, 2023. "Computing Profit-Maximizing Bid Shading Factors in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 61(3), pages 1009-1035, March.
    12. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    13. Zulehner, Christine & Gugler, Klaus Peter & Weichselbaumer, Michael, 2015. "Analysis of mergers in first-price auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 10799, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Adrien Coiffard & Raphaële Préget & Mabel Tidball, 2023. "Target versus budget reverse auctions: an online experiment using the strategy method," Working Papers hal-04055743, HAL.
    15. Adrien Coiffard & Raphaële Préget & Mabel Tidball, 2023. "Target versus budget reverse auctions: an online experiment using the strategy method," CEE-M Working Papers hal-04055743, CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro.
    16. Anatolitis, Vasilios & Welisch, Marijke, 2017. "Putting renewable energy auctions into action – An agent-based model of onshore wind power auctions in Germany," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 394-402.
    17. Chatterjee, Rittwik & Chattopadhyay, Srobonti, 2015. "Competition and Auctioning Licenses," MPRA Paper 67086, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Cameron Hepburn & Michael Grubb & Karsten Neuhoff & Felix Matthes & Maximilien Tse, 2006. "Auctioning of EU ETS phase II allowances: how and why?," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(1), pages 137-160, January.
    19. Ianni, A., 2002. "Reinforcement learning and the power law of practice: some analytical results," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 203, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    20. Drabik Ewa, 2013. "Several Remarks on Banach–Mazur Games and its Applications Ewa Drabik," Foundations of Management, Sciendo, vol. 5(1), pages 1-5, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    conservation contract; auction; learning; developing country; non-market goods;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
    • Q21 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cid:wpfacu:35. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chuck McKenney (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ciharus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.