Memetics & Voting: How Nature May Make us Public Spirited
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsMemetics; evolution; voting; warm glow; civic duty; free riding; public choice; public goods;
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-05-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2005-05-14 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2005-05-14 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2005-05-14 (Positive Political Economics)
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