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Conditional Retrospective Voting in Large Elections

Author

Listed:
  • Ignacio Esponda
  • Demian Pouzo

Abstract

We introduce a solution concept in the context of large elections with private information by embedding a model of boundedly rational voters into an otherwise standard equilibrium setting. A retrospective voting equilibrium (RVE) formalizes the idea that voters evaluate alternatives based on past performance. Since counterfactual outcomes are not observed, the sample from which voters learn is potentially biased, leading to systematically biased beliefs in equilibrium. We provide an explicit learning foundation for RVE and contrast it to standard solution concepts in the literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Ignacio Esponda & Demian Pouzo, 2017. "Conditional Retrospective Voting in Large Elections," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 54-75, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:9:y:2017:i:2:p:54-75
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140283
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    6. Shuyao Ke & Liangjun Su & Peter C. B. Phillips, 2022. "Unified Factor Model Estimation and Inference under Short and Long Memory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2351, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    7. Kfir Eliaz & Simone Galperti & Ran Spiegler, 2022. "False Narratives and Political Mobilization," Papers 2206.12621, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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