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Ignacio Esponda

Personal Details

First Name:Ignacio
Middle Name:
Last Name:Esponda
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pes109
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://apps.olin.wustl.edu/faculty/esponda/Ignacio_Esponda/Home.html

Affiliation

Olin School of Business
Washington University in St. Louis

St. Louis, Missouri (United States)
http://www.olin.wustl.edu/

:

Campus Box 1133, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis MO 63130-4899
RePEc:edi:oswusus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Ignacio Esponda & Demian Pouzo, 2015. "Equilibrium in Misspecified Markov Decision Processes," Papers 1502.06901, arXiv.org, revised May 2016.
  2. Ignacio Esponda & Demian Pouzo, 2014. "Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents with Misspecified Models," Papers 1411.1152, arXiv.org, revised May 2016.

Articles

  1. Esponda, Ignacio, 2013. "Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: A framework for robust predictions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
  2. Ignacio Esponda, 2008. "Information feedback in first price auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 491-508.
  3. Ignacio Esponda, 2008. "Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1269-1291, September.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Ignacio Esponda & Demian Pouzo, 2015. "Equilibrium in Misspecified Markov Decision Processes," Papers 1502.06901, arXiv.org, revised May 2016.

    Cited by:

    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Romanyuk, Gleb & Strack, Philipp, 2017. "Active learning with a misspecified prior," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.

  2. Ignacio Esponda & Demian Pouzo, 2014. "Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents with Misspecified Models," Papers 1411.1152, arXiv.org, revised May 2016.

    Cited by:

    1. Alex Rees-Jones & Dmitry Taubinsky, 2016. "Heuristic Perceptions of the Income Tax: Evidence and Implications for Debiasing," NBER Working Papers 22884, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2017. "Learning and Equilibrium Refinements in Signalling Games," Papers 1709.01024, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2017.
    3. In-Koo Cho & Kenneth Kasa, 2016. "Gresham’S Law Of Model Averaging," Discussion Papers dp16-06, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    4. Ran Spiegler, 2016. "Can Agents with Causal Misperceptions be Systemically Fooled?," Discussion Papers 1619, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
    5. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2017. "The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 1-8.
    6. Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2017. "Learning and Type Compatibility in Signalling Games," Papers 1702.01819, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2017.
    7. Fudenberg, Drew & Romanyuk, Gleb & Strack, Philipp, 2017. "Active learning with a misspecified prior," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.
    8. Ignacio Esponda & Demian Pouzo, 2017. "Conditional Retrospective Voting in Large Elections," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 54-75, May.
    9. Ran Spiegler, 2017. "“Data Monkeys”: A Procedural Model of Extrapolation from Partial Statistics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(4), pages 1818-1841.
    10. Bohren, Aislinn & Hauser, Daniel, 2017. "Bounded Rationality And Learning: A Framework and A Robustness Result," CEPR Discussion Papers 12036, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

Articles

  1. Esponda, Ignacio, 2013. "Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: A framework for robust predictions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.

    Cited by:

    1. Gabriel Desgranges & Stéphane Gauthier, 2015. "Rationalizability and Efficiency in an Asymmetric Cournot Oligopoly," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00975002, HAL.
    2. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci, 2015. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(2), pages 646-677, February.
    3. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci, 2011. "Selfconfirming Equilibrium and Uncertainty," Working Papers 428, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    4. Fudenberg, Drew & Kamada, Yuichiro, 2015. "Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium," Scholarly Articles 27303656, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    5. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Emiliano Catonini & Giacomo Lanzani & Massimo Marinacci, 2017. "Ambiguity Attitudes and Self-Confi rming Equilibrium in Sequential Games," Working Papers 607, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    6. Jernej Copic, 2015. "Disagreement, information and welfare," 2015 Meeting Papers 1344, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Giuseppe Attanasi & Pierpaolo Battigalli & Elena Manzoni, 2013. "Incomplete Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game," Working Papers 480, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.

  2. Ignacio Esponda, 2008. "Information feedback in first price auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 491-508.

    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Jehiel, 2011. "Manipulative Auction Design," Post-Print halshs-00754541, HAL.
    2. Christoph March, 2016. "Adaptive Social Learning," CESifo Working Paper Series 5783, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Iftekhar, Md Sayed & Tisdell, John G., 2015. "Bidding and performance in multiple unit combinatorial fishery quota auctions: Role of information feedbacks," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 233-243.
    4. Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo & Manuel Castro, 2011. "The nature of information and its effect on bidding behavior: laboratory evidence in a common value auction," Working Paper 8510, USC Lusk Center for Real Estate.
    5. Zacharias Maniadis, 2008. "Essays in Aggregate Information, The Media and Special Interests," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002258, David K. Levine.
    6. Zacharias Maniadis, 2014. "Selective revelation of public information and self-confirming equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(4), pages 991-1008, November.
    7. Ariel Pakes, 2008. "Theory and Empirical Work on Imperfectly Competitive Markets," NBER Working Papers 14117, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

  3. Ignacio Esponda, 2008. "Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1269-1291, September.

    Cited by:

    1. David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "A Theory of Deception," Post-Print hal-00701286, HAL.
    2. Drew Fudenberg, 2006. "Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(3), pages 694-711, September.
    3. Miettinen, Topi, 2009. "Paying Attention to Payoffs in Analogy-Based Learning," SITE Working Paper Series 7, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.
    4. Miettinen, Topi, 2009. "The partially cursed and the analogy-based expectation equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 162-164, November.
    5. Christoph March, 2016. "Adaptive Social Learning," CESifo Working Paper Series 5783, CESifo Group Munich.
    6. Ran Spiegler, 2016. "Bayesian Networks and Boundedly Rational Expectations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 131(3), pages 1243-1290.
    7. Jehiel, Philippe, 2015. "Investment strategy and selection bias: An equilibrium perspective on overconfidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 10868, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2017. "Framing Game Theory," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1072, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
      • Hitoshi Matsushima, 2017. "Framing Game Theory," CARF F-Series CARF-F-425, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    9. Xavier Gabaix, 2014. "A Sparsity-Based Model of Bounded Rationality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 129(4), pages 1661-1710.
    10. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci, 2015. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(2), pages 646-677, February.
    11. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci, 2011. "Selfconfirming Equilibrium and Uncertainty," Working Papers 428, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    12. Philippe Jehiel & David Ettinger, 2007. "Towards a Theory of Deception," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000126, UCLA Department of Economics.
    13. Michael Grubb, 2015. "Behavioral Consumers in Industrial Organization: An Overview," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 47(3), pages 247-258, November.
    14. Kristóf Madarász, 2015. "Projection Equilibrium: Definition and Applications to Social Investment and Persuasion," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2015/566, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    15. Vasiliki Skreta & Laura Veldkamp, 2009. "Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of Ratings Inflation," NBER Working Papers 14761, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Ignacio Esponda Jr. & Emanuel Vespa Jr., 2014. "Hypothetical Thinking and Information Extraction in the Laboratory," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 180-202, November.
    17. Avi Goldfarb & Mo Xiao, 2011. "Who Thinks about the Competition? Managerial Ability and Strategic Entry in US Local Telephone Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 3130-3161, December.
    18. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2017. "The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 1-8.
    19. Shengwu Li, 2017. "Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(11), pages 3257-3287, November.
    20. Madarász, Kristóf, 2015. "Projection Equilibrium: Definition and Applications to Social Investment and Persuasion," CEPR Discussion Papers 10636, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. Jehiel, Philippe & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 533-557, March.
    22. S. Nageeb Ali, 2011. "Learning Self-Control," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(2), pages 857-893.
    23. Ignacio Esponda & Demian Pouzo, 2014. "Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents with Misspecified Models," Papers 1411.1152, arXiv.org, revised May 2016.
    24. Ignacio Esponda & Demian Pouzo, 2015. "Equilibrium in Misspecified Markov Decision Processes," Papers 1502.06901, arXiv.org, revised May 2016.
    25. Andrew Ellis & Michele Piccione, 2017. "Correlation Misperception in Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(4), pages 1264-1292, April.
    26. Koch, Christian & Penczynski, Stefan P., 2018. "The winner's curse: Conditional reasoning and belief formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 57-102.
    27. Martin, Daniel, 2017. "Strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 131-145.
    28. Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2017. "Learning and Type Compatibility in Signalling Games," Papers 1702.01819, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2017.
    29. Esponda, Ignacio, 2013. "Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: A framework for robust predictions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
    30. Spiegler, Ran, 2017. "Behavioral Economics and the Atheoretical Style," CEPR Discussion Papers 11786, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    31. Athey, Susan, 2002. "Monotone Comparative Statics Under Uncertainty," Scholarly Articles 3372263, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    32. Fudenberg, Drew & Romanyuk, Gleb & Strack, Philipp, 2017. "Active learning with a misspecified prior," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.
    33. Edward Cartwright & Amrish Patel, 2008. "Public Goods, Social Norms and Naive Beliefs," Studies in Economics 0807, School of Economics, University of Kent.
    34. Nick Vikander, 2011. "Capacity Constraints and Beliefs about Demand," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-015/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    35. J. Patrick Gunning, 2010. "Incentive Divergence and the Global Financial Crisis," Chapters,in: Macroeconomic Theory and its Failings, chapter 5 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    36. Miettinen, Topi, 2008. "Analogy-based Expectations and the Partially Cursed Equilibrium," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 708, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 12 Dec 2008.
    37. Liu, Zhen, 2016. "Games with incomplete information when players are partially aware of others’ signals," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 58-70.
    38. Nick Vikander, 2014. "Sellouts, Beliefs, and Bandwagon Behavior," Discussion Papers 14-15, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    39. Ignacio Esponda & Demian Pouzo, 2017. "Conditional Retrospective Voting in Large Elections," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 54-75, May.
    40. Cesar Martinelli, 2011. "Ignorance and Naivete in Large Elections," Working Papers 1107, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    41. Amrish Patel & Edward Cartwright, 2009. "Social Norms and Naive Beliefs," Studies in Economics 0906, School of Economics, University of Kent.
    42. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "Simple versus rich language in disclosure games," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(3), pages 163-175, September.
    43. Lin, C.-Y. Cynthia & Muehlegger, Erich J., 2013. "On the use of heuristics to approximate competitors’ private information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 10-23.
    44. Erhan Bayraktar & Alexander Munk, 2017. "Mini-Flash Crashes, Model Risk, and Optimal Execution," Papers 1705.09827, arXiv.org.
    45. Ran Spiegler, 2017. "“Data Monkeys”: A Procedural Model of Extrapolation from Partial Statistics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(4), pages 1818-1841.
    46. Philippe Jehiel, 2017. "Investment strategy and selection bias: An equilibrium perspective on overoptimism," PSE Working Papers halshs-01557560, HAL.

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NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2014-11-17 2015-02-28

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