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Mental Models and Learning: The Case of Base-Rate Neglect

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  • Ignacio Esponda
  • Emanuel Vespa
  • Sevgi Yuksel

Abstract

We experimentally document persistence of suboptimal behavior despite ample opportunities to learn from feedback in a canonical updating problem where people suffer from base-rate neglect. Our results provide insights on the mechanisms hindering learning from feedback. Importantly, our results suggest mistakes are more likely to be persistent when they are driven by incorrect mental models that miss or misrepresent important aspects of the environment. Such models induce confidence in initial answers, limiting engagement with and learning from feedback. We substantiate these insights in an alternative scenario where individuals involved in a voting problem overlook the importance of being pivotal.

Suggested Citation

  • Ignacio Esponda & Emanuel Vespa & Sevgi Yuksel, 2024. "Mental Models and Learning: The Case of Base-Rate Neglect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 114(3), pages 752-782, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:114:y:2024:i:3:p:752-82
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Kai Barron & Steffen Huck & Philippe Jehiel, 2024. "Everyday Econometricians: Selection Neglect and Overoptimism When Learning from Others," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 162-198, August.
    3. Selten, Reinhard & Stoecker, Rolf, 1986. "End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 47-70, March.
    4. Harrison, Glenn W & Hirshleifer, Jack, 1989. "An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 201-225, February.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Little, Andrew T. & Moore, Don A & Augenblick, Ned & Backus, Matthew, 2025. "Assumptions, Disagreement, and Overprecision: Theory and Evidence," OSF Preprints mnv4k_v1, Center for Open Science.
    3. Kevin He & Ran Shorrer & Mengjia Xia, 2025. "Human Misperception of Generative-AI Alignment: A Laboratory Experiment," Papers 2502.14708, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2025.
    4. Ilke Aydogan & Aurélien Baillon & Emmanuel Kemel & Chen Li, 2025. "How much do we learn? Measuring symmetric and asymmetric deviations from Bayesian updating through choices," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(1), pages 329-365, January.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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