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Batch Queues with Choice of Arrivals: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Study

  • William E. Stein

    (Texas A&M University)

  • Amnon Rapoport

    (University of Arizona & Hong Kong University of Science & Technology)

  • Darryl A. Seale

    (University of Nevada Las Vegas)

  • Hongtao Zhang

    (Hong Kong University of Science & Technology)

  • Rami Zwick

    (Hong Kong University of Science & Technology)

We study both theoretically and experimentally the decisions players make in two queueing games with batch service. In both games, players are asked to independently decide when to join a discrete-time queue to receive service, or they may simply choose not to join it at all. Equilibrium solutions in pure and mixed strategies are constructed for two games where balking is prohibited and where it is allowed. They are then tested experimentally in a study that varies the game type (balking vs. no balking) and information structure (private vs. public information) in a 2X2 between-subject design. With repeated iterations of the stage game, all four experimental conditions result in aggregate, but not individual, behavior approaching mixed-strategy equilibrium play.

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File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/exp/papers/0411/0411001.pdf
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Experimental with number 0411001.

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Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: 09 Nov 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0411001
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 45
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org

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  1. Richard Arnott & Andre de Palma & Robin Lindsey, 1985. "Economics of a Bottleneck," Working Papers 636, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  2. Darryl Seale & James Parco & William Stein & Amnon Rapoport, 2005. "Joining a Queue or Staying Out: Effects of Information Structure and Service Time on Arrival and Staying Out Decisions," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 117-144, June.
  3. Axel Ockenfels & Reinhard Selten, 2002. "Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Feedback in First Price Auctions," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-12, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  4. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-81, September.
  5. Howard J. Weiss, 1979. "The Computation of Optimal Control Limits for a Queue with Batch Services," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(4), pages 320-328, April.
  6. Darryl Seale & Amnon Rapoport, 2000. "Elicitation of Strategy Profiles in Large Group Coordination Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 153-179, October.
  7. Holt, Charles A, Jr & Sherman, Roger, 1982. "Waiting-Line Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 280-94, April.
  8. Rapoport, Amnon & Seale, Darryl A. & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "Coordination and Learning Behavior in Large Groups with Asymmetric Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 111-136, April.
  9. Rapoport, Amnon & Stein, William E. & Parco, James E. & Seale, Darryl A., 2004. "Equilibrium play in single-server queues with endogenously determined arrival times," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 67-91, September.
  10. Vickrey, William S, 1969. "Congestion Theory and Transport Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 251-60, May.
  11. Selten, Reinhard & Stoecker, Rolf, 1986. "End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 47-70, March.
  12. Naor, P, 1969. "The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 37(1), pages 15-24, January.
  13. Eyal Winter & Amnon Rapoport & Darryl A. Seale, 2000. "An experimental study of coordination and learning in iterated two-market entry games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 661-687.
  14. J. Medhi, 1975. "Waiting Time Distribution in a Poisson Queue with a General Bulk Service Rule," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 21(7), pages 777-782, March.
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