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The Parking Lot Problem

Author

Listed:
  • Maria Arbatskaya

    (Department of Economics, Emory University)

  • Kaushik Mukhopadhaya

    (Department of Economics, Emory University)

  • Eric Rasmusen

    (CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo and Kelley School of Business, Indiana University)

Abstract

If there is queueing for an underpriced good, the queueing can eat up the entire surplus, eliminating the social value of the good. An implication is that there is a discontinuity in social welfare between "enough" and "not enough" for certain goods such as parking spaces. This implies that if there is uncertainty in the number of demanders, the amount of the good should be set well in excess of the mean demand

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Arbatskaya & Kaushik Mukhopadhaya & Eric Rasmusen, 2001. "The Parking Lot Problem," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-119, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    • Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2001cf119
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    File URL: http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2001/2001cf119.pdf
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    Other versions of this item:

    • Maria Arbatskaya & Kaushik Mukhopadhaya & Eric Rasmusen, 2007. "The Parking Lot Problem," Working Papers 2007-04, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Kevin Hasker & Eren Inci, 2014. "Free Parking For All In Shopping Malls," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55(4), pages 1281-1304, November.
    2. Martijn B.W. Kobus & Jos N. van Ommeren & Hans R.A. Koster & Piet Rietveld, 2013. "Congestible Goods and Hoarding: A Test based on Students' Use of University Computers," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-083/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. Michael D. Grubb & Paul Oyer, 2008. "Who Benefits from Tax-Advantaged Employee Benefits?: Evidence from University Parking," NBER Working Papers 14062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L91 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Transportation: General
    • R4 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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