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Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting

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  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein

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  • Martin Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2002. "Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000037, David K. Levine.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000037
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David P. Myatt, 2002. "A New Theory of Strategic Voting [revised]," Economics Series Working Papers 93, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    2. Osborne, Martin J & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998. "Games with Procedurally Rational Players," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 834-847, September.
    3. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
    4. McKelvey, Richard D. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1985. "Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 55-85, June.
    5. David P. Myatt, 2000. "The New Theory of Strategic Voting," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1586, Econometric Society.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Zoi Terzopoulou & Ulle Endriss, 2022. "Strategic manipulation in judgment aggregation under higher-level reasoning," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 92(2), pages 363-385, March.
    2. Ariel Rubinstein & Ran Spiegler, 2008. "Money Pumps in the Market," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(1), pages 237-253, March.
    3. Häfner, Samuel, 2018. "Stable biased sampling," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 109-122.
    4. Srinivas Arigapudi & Yuval Heller & Amnon Schreiber, 2021. "Sampling dynamics and stable mixing in hawk-dove games," Papers 2107.08423, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
    5. , & , H. & ,, 2015. "Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
    6. Sethi, Rajiv, 2021. "Stable sampling in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    7. Haavio, Markus & Kotakorpi, Kaisa, 2011. "The political economy of sin taxes," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 575-594, May.
    8. Philippe Jehiel, 2022. "Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium and Related Concepts:Theory, Applications, and Beyond," Working Papers halshs-03735680, HAL.
    9. Gori, Michele, 2021. "Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 350-369.
    10. Spiegler, Ran, 2018. "News and Archival Information in Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 12805, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Arigapudi, Srinivas & Heller, Yuval & Schreiber, Amnon, 2021. "Sampling Dynamics and Stable Mixing in Hawk–Dove Games," MPRA Paper 108819, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Zoi Terzopoulou & Ulle Endriss, 2019. "Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(3), pages 415-442, October.
    13. Duarte Gonc{c}alves, 2022. "Sequential Sampling Equilibrium," Papers 2212.07725, arXiv.org.
    14. Ignacio Esponda & Demian Pouzo, 2017. "Conditional Retrospective Voting in Large Elections," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 54-75, May.
    15. Ran Spiegler, 2006. "The Market for Quacks," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(4), pages 1113-1131.
    16. Spiegler, Ran, 2021. "Modeling players with random “data access”," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    17. Yuval Salant & Josh Cherry, 2020. "Statistical Inference in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(4), pages 1725-1752, July.
    18. Ryoji Sawa, 2022. "Statistical Inference in Evolutionary Dynamics," Working Papers e170, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    19. Förster, Manuel & Karos, Dominik, 2021. "From prejudice to racial profiling and back. A naἴve intuitive statistician's curse," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 644, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    20. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2005. "Signaling In A Dynamic Contest With Boundedly Rational Players," Working Papers 0510, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.

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