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Satisfaction and adaptation in voting behavior: an empirical exploration

Author

Listed:
  • Marco Martorana

    (University of Catania, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods)

  • Isidoro Mazza

    (University of Catania, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods)

Abstract

Dynamic models of learning and adaptation have provided realistic predictions in terms of voting behavior. This study aims at contributing to their scant empirical verification. We develop a learning algorithm based on bounded rationality estimating the pattern of learning process through a two-stage econometric model. The analysis links voting behavior to past choices and economic satisfaction derived from previous period election and state of the economy. This represents a novelty in the literature on voting that assumes given voter preferences. Results show that persistence is positively affected by the combination of income changes and past behavior and by union membership.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Martorana & Isidoro Mazza, 2010. "Satisfaction and adaptation in voting behavior: an empirical exploration," DEMQ Working Paper Series 2010/6, University of Catania, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:demqwp:2010_006
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    JEL classification:

    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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