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A Primary Cause of Partisanship? Nomination Systems and Legislator Ideology

Author

Listed:
  • Eric McGhee
  • Seth Masket
  • Boris Shor
  • Steven Rogers
  • Nolan McCarty

Abstract

Many theoretical and empirical accounts of representation argue that primary elections are a polarizing influence. Likewise, many reformers advocate opening party nominations to nonmembers as a way of increasing the number of moderate elected officials. Data and measurement constraints, however, have limited the range of empirical tests of this argument. We marry a unique new data set of state legislator ideal points to a detailed accounting of primary systems in the United States to gauge the effect of primary systems on polarization. We find that the openness of a primary election has little, if any, effect on the extremism of the politicians it produces.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric McGhee & Seth Masket & Boris Shor & Steven Rogers & Nolan McCarty, 2014. "A Primary Cause of Partisanship? Nomination Systems and Legislator Ideology," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 58(2), pages 337-351, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:58:y:2014:i:2:p:337-351
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12070
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    Cited by:

    1. Cintolesi, Andrea, 2022. "Political polarization and primary elections," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 596-617.
    2. Olga Gorelkina & Ioanna Grypari & Erin Hengel, 2023. "The theory of straight ticket voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(3), pages 365-381, April.
    3. Giovanni Andreottola, 2020. "Signaling Valence in Primary Elections," CSEF Working Papers 559, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    4. Kim, Jonghoon & Jeong, Hyeong-Chai & Baek, Seung Ki, 2022. "Symmetric Nash equilibrium of political polarization in a two-party system," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 607(C).
    5. Tinghua Yu & Elliott Ash, 2021. "Polarization and Political Selection," BCAM Working Papers 2105, Birkbeck Centre for Applied Macroeconomics.
    6. Andreottola, Giovanni, 2021. "Signaling valence in primary elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 1-32.

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