IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tin/wpaper/20100123.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

When Galatea cares about her Reputation: How having Faith in your Workers reduces their Motivation to shine

Author

Listed:
  • Jurjen J.A. Kamphorst

    (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

  • Otto H. Swank

    (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Abstract

This discussion paper led to a publication in the European Economic Review (2013). Vol. 60, pp. 91-104. We develop a theory of leadership that focuses on the role managers play in motivating employees through their attitude towards employees. We model a manager's attitude as her perception about employees' abilities of successfully completing challenging tasks. We show that a positive attitude motivates employees who are driven by monetary rewards. A negative attitude may motivate employees who are driven by concerns about their reputation for being able. When employees are driven by monetary rewards and care about their reputations, an increase in the reward for successfully completing challenging tasks may lead employees to shy away from these tasks.

Suggested Citation

  • Jurjen J.A. Kamphorst & Otto H. Swank, 2010. "When Galatea cares about her Reputation: How having Faith in your Workers reduces their Motivation to shine," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-123/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20100123
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/10123.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean Tirole & Roland Bénabou, 2006. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1652-1678, December.
    2. Hermalin, Benjamin E, 1998. "Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1188-1206, December.
    3. Gary Charness & David Masclet & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2010. "Competitive Preferences and Status as an Incentive : Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 1016, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    4. Friebel, Guido & Schnedler, Wendelin, 2011. "Team governance: Empowerment or hierarchical control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(1-2), pages 1-13, April.
    5. Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, 1993. "Leadership Style and Incentives," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(11), pages 1299-1318, November.
    6. Eric Van den Steen, 2005. "Organizational Beliefs and Managerial Vision," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(1), pages 256-283, April.
    7. Dixit, Avinash & Weibull, Jörgen, 2006. "Political Polarization," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 655, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 19 Apr 2007.
    8. Junichiro Ishida, 2006. "Optimal Promotion Policies with the Looking-Glass Effect," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(4), pages 857-878, October.
    9. Bauke Visser, 2007. "Motivating Through Delegating Tasks or Giving Attention," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 731-742, October.
    10. Klar, Yechiel & Medding, Aviva & Sarel, Dan, 1996. "Nonunique Invulnerability: Singular versus Distributional Probabilities and Unrealistic Optimism in Comparative Risk Judgments," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 229-245, August.
    11. Abhijit Banerjee & Rohini Somanathan, 2001. "A Simple Model of Voice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(1), pages 189-227.
    12. Mathias Dewatripont & Ian Jewitt & Jean Tirole, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 183-198.
    13. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(3), pages 489-520.
    14. Mathias Dewatripont & Ian Jewitt & Jean Tirole, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 199-217.
    15. Carrillo, Juan D., 2003. "Job assignments as a screening device," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 881-905, June.
    16. Botond Köszegi, 2006. "Ego Utility, Overconfidence, and Task Choice," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(4), pages 673-707, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    reputation; worker motivation; task choice; principle-agent; Giffen goods;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • M59 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Other

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20100123. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/tinbenl.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.