Competitive Preferences and Status as an Incentive: Experimental Evidence
In this paper, we investigate individuals' investment in status in an environment where no monetary return can possibly be derived from reaching a better relative position. We use a real-effort experiment in which we permit individuals to learn and potentially improve their status (rank). We find that people express both intrinsic motivation and a taste for status. Indeed, people increase their effort when they are simply informed about their relative performance, and people pay both to sabotage others' output and to artificially increase their own relative performance. In addition, stronger group identity favors positive rivalry and discourages sabotage among peers.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Publication status:||Published in Working paper GATE 2010-16 ; Working Paper Series qt1vr4g446, Department of Economics, UC Santa B.. 2010|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00497974|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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