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The speed of justice

Author

Listed:
  • Kondylis,Florence
  • Stein,Mattea

Abstract

Can changing the rules of the game affect government performance? This paper studies the impact of a simple procedural reform on the efficiency and quality of adjudication in Senegal. The reform gave judges the duty and powers to conclude pre-trial proceedings within a four-month deadline. The analysis combines a staggered rollout across the six civil and commercial chambers of the Court of Dakar and three years of high-frequency caseload data to construct an event study. The analysis finds a reduction in procedural formalism, as the length of the pre-trial stage decreases by 42.9 days (0.29 standard deviation) and the number of case-level pre-trial hearings is reduced, while judges are more likely to impose deadlines. The effect is similar for small and large cases, and fast and slow judges are equally likely to apply the reform. The evidence suggests that these efficiency gains have no adverse impact on quality, and the paper documents positive firm-level effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Kondylis,Florence & Stein,Mattea, 2018. "The speed of justice," Policy Research Working Paper Series 8372, The World Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:8372
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Johannes Buckenmaier & Eugen Dimant & Ann-Christin Posten & Ulrich Schmidt, 2021. "Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 177-201, April.
    2. Matthieu Chemin, 2020. "Judicial Efficiency and Firm Productivity: Evidence from a World Database of Judicial Reforms," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 102(1), pages 49-64, March.
    3. Decarolis, Francesco & Mattera, Gianpiero & Menon, Carlo, 2020. "Delays at the Border: Court Efficiency and Delays in Public Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 14856, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Chemin, Matthieu & Chen, Daniel L. & Di Maro, Vincenzo & Kimalu, Paul & Mokaya, Momanyi & Ramos-Maqueda, Manuel, 2022. "Data Science for Justice: The Short-Term Effects of a Randomized Judicial Reform in Kenya," TSE Working Papers 22-1391, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    5. Joyce Sadka & Enrique Seira & Christopher Woodruff, 2024. "Information and Bargaining through Agents: Experimental Evidence from Mexico’s Labour Courts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 91(6), pages 3677-3711.
    6. Philipp Barteska & Jay Euijung Lee, 2024. "Bureaucrats and the Korean export miracle," Discussion Papers 2024-11, Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP).
    7. Woodruff, Christopher & Sadka, Joyce & Seira Bejarano, Enrique, 2018. "Information and Bargaining through Agents: Experimental Evidence from Mexico’s Labor Courts," CEPR Discussion Papers 13261, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Aberra, Adam & Chemin, Matthieu, 2021. "Does legal representation increase investment? Evidence from a field experiment in Kenya," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    9. Chemin, Matthieu & Kimalu, Paul & Newman-Bachand, Simon, 2024. "Courts, Crime and Economic Performance: Evidence from a Judicial Reform in Kenya," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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