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Loose commitment in medium-scale macroeconomic models: theory and applications

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  • Davide Debortoli
  • Junior Maih
  • Ricardo Nunes

Abstract

This paper proposes a method and a toolkit for solving optimal policy with imperfect commitment. As opposed to the existing literature, our method can be employed in medium- and large-scale models typically used in monetary policy. We apply our method to the Smets and Wouters (2007) model, where we show that imperfect commitment has relevant implications for interest rate setting, the sources of business cycle fluctuations, and welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Davide Debortoli & Junior Maih & Ricardo Nunes, 2011. "Loose commitment in medium-scale macroeconomic models: theory and applications," International Finance Discussion Papers 1034, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgif:1034
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    Cited by:

    1. Cateau, Gino & Shukayev, Malik, 2016. "Credibility of History-Dependent Monetary Policies and Macroeconomic Instability," Working Papers 2016-7, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
    2. Ippei Fujiwara & Timothy Kam & Takeki Sunakawa, 2016. "A note on imperfect credibility," CAMA Working Papers 2016-37, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    3. Ricardo Nunes & Jinill Kim & Jesper Linde & Davide Debortoli, 2014. "Designing a Simple Loss Function for the Fed: Does the Dual Mandate Make Sense?," 2014 Meeting Papers 1043, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    4. Fabio Canetg, 2018. "Strategic Deviations in Optimal Monetary Policy," Diskussionsschriften dp1817, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    5. Haberis, Alex & Harrison, Richard & Waldron, Matt, 2019. "Uncertain policy promises," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 459-474.
    6. Ragna Alstadheim & Øistein Røisland, 2017. "When Preferences for a Stable Interest Rate Become Self‐Defeating," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(2-3), pages 393-415, March.
    7. Lakdawala, Aeimit & Wu, Shu, 2017. "Federal Reserve credibility and the term structure of interest rates," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 364-389.
    8. Givens, Gregory E., 2016. "On the gains from monetary policy commitment under deep habits," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 19-36.
    9. Lu, Yang K. & King, Robert G. & Pasten, Ernesto, 2016. "Optimal reputation building in the New Keynesian model," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 233-249.
    10. Davide Debortoli & Jinill Kim & Jesper Lindé & Ricardo Nunes, 2019. "Designing a Simple Loss Function for Central Banks: Does a Dual Mandate Make Sense?," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(621), pages 2010-2038.
    11. Fujiwara, Ippei & Kam, Timothy & Sunakawa, Takeki, 2019. "On two notions of imperfect credibility in optimal monetary policies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 22-25.
    12. Davide Debortoli & Aeimit Lakdawala, 2016. "How Credible Is the Federal Reserve? A Structural Estimation of Policy Re-optimizations," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 42-76, July.
    13. Francesco Furlanetto & Paolo Gelain & Marzie Taheri Sanjani, 2014. "Output Gap in Presence of Financial Frictions and Monetary Policy Trade-offs," IMF Working Papers 2014/128, International Monetary Fund.
    14. J. Scott Davis & Ippei Fujiwara & Jiao Wang, 2018. "Dealing with Time Inconsistency: Inflation Targeting versus Exchange Rate Targeting," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(7), pages 1369-1399, October.
    15. Ippei Fujiwara & Scott Davis, 2017. "Dealing with Time-inconsistency: Inflation Targeting vs. Exchange Rate Targeting," 2017 Meeting Papers 795, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    16. Fabio Canetg, 2021. "Strategic deviations in optimal monetary policy," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Springer;Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, vol. 157(1), pages 1-13, December.
    17. Nunes, Ricardo & Park, Donghyun & Rondina, Luca, 2021. "Imperfect credibility, sticky wages, and welfare," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    18. J. Scott Davis & Ippei Fujiwara, 2015. "Pegging the exchange rate to gain monetary policy credibility," Globalization Institute Working Papers 224, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    19. Eurilton Araújo, 2016. "Monetary Policy Credibility and the Comovement between Stock Returns and Inflation," Working Papers Series 449, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C32 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes; State Space Models
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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