IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v174y2019icp22-25.html

On two notions of imperfect credibility in optimal monetary policies

Author

Listed:
  • Fujiwara, Ippei
  • Kam, Timothy
  • Sunakawa, Takeki

Abstract

We explore how outcomes of optimal monetary policy with loose commitment (Schaumburg and Tambalotti, 2007; Debortoli and Nunes, 2010) with the non-reoptimization probability of α can be interpretable as outcomes of deeper optimal policy under sustainable plans (Chari and Kehoe, 1990) with N-period punishment. In a standard monetary-policy framework, we show that, for any sufficiently high value of α, there exists an integer N such that impulse responses to the cost-push shock under each policy are similar to each other.

Suggested Citation

  • Fujiwara, Ippei & Kam, Timothy & Sunakawa, Takeki, 2019. "On two notions of imperfect credibility in optimal monetary policies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 22-25.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:174:y:2019:i:c:p:22-25
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.10.010
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176518304233
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.10.010?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tauchen, George, 1986. "Finite state markov-chain approximations to univariate and vector autoregressions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 177-181.
    2. Kurozumi, Takushi, 2008. "Optimal sustainable monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(7), pages 1277-1289, October.
    3. Loisel, Olivier, 2008. "Central bank reputation in a forward-looking model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(11), pages 3718-3742, November.
    4. Calvo, Guillermo A., 1983. "Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 383-398, September.
    5. Bodenstein, Martin & Hebden, James & Nunes, Ricardo, 2012. "Imperfect credibility and the zero lower bound," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 135-149.
    6. Debortoli, Davide & Maih, Junior & Nunes, Ricardo, 2014. "Loose Commitment In Medium-Scale Macroeconomic Models: Theory And Applications," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 175-198, January.
    7. Roberds, William, 1987. "Models of Policy under Stochastic Replanning," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(3), pages 731-755, October.
    8. Schaumburg, Ernst & Tambalotti, Andrea, 2007. "An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 302-324, March.
    9. Debortoli, Davide & Nunes, Ricardo, 2010. "Fiscal policy under loose commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 1005-1032, May.
    10. Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes, 2013. "Lack Of Commitment And The Level Of Debt," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(5), pages 1053-1078, October.
    11. Sunakawa, Takeki, 2015. "A quantitative analysis of optimal sustainable monetary policies," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 119-135.
    12. Taisuke Nakata, 2018. "Reputation and Liquidity Traps," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 28, pages 252-268, April.
    13. Davide Debortoli & Aeimit Lakdawala, 2016. "How Credible Is the Federal Reserve? A Structural Estimation of Policy Re-optimizations," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 42-76, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2021. "Imperfect Credibility versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 0(1), pages 43-63.
    2. Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2021. "Hopf Bifurcation From New-Keynesian Taylor Rule To Ramsey Optimal Policy," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(8), pages 2204-2236, December.
    3. Batista, Quentin & Nakata, Taisuke & Sunakawa, Takeki, 2023. "Credible Forward Guidance," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
    4. Gino Cateau & Malik Shukayev, 2022. "Limited commitment, endogenous credibility and the challenges of price‐level targeting," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(4), pages 1834-1861, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ippei Fujiwara & Timothy Kam & Takeki Sunakawa, 2016. "A Note on Imperfect Credibility," CAMA Working Papers 2016-37, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    2. Eurilton Araújo, 2016. "Monetary Policy Credibility and the Comovement between Stock Returns and Inflation," Working Papers Series 449, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    3. Gino Cateau & Malik Shukayev, 2022. "Limited commitment, endogenous credibility and the challenges of price‐level targeting," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(4), pages 1834-1861, November.
    4. Sunakawa, Takeki, 2015. "A quantitative analysis of optimal sustainable monetary policies," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 119-135.
    5. Yang Lu & Ernesto Pasten & Robert King, 2013. "Policy design with private sector skepticism in the textbook New Keynesian model," 2013 Meeting Papers 241, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Batista, Quentin & Nakata, Taisuke & Sunakawa, Takeki, 2023. "Credible Forward Guidance," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
    7. Fabio Canetg, 2018. "Strategic Deviations in Optimal Monetary Policy," Diskussionsschriften dp1817, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    8. Lakdawala, Aeimit & Wu, Shu, 2017. "Federal Reserve credibility and the term structure of interest rates," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 364-389.
    9. Oscar To, 2024. "Stochastic credibility and optimal monetary policy," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(S1), pages 124-134, May.
    10. Givens, Gregory E., 2016. "On the gains from monetary policy commitment under deep habits," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 19-36.
    11. Fabio Canetg, 2021. "Strategic deviations in optimal monetary policy," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Springer;Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, vol. 157(1), pages 1-13, December.
    12. Nunes, Ricardo & Park, Donghyun & Rondina, Luca, 2021. "Imperfect credibility, sticky wages, and welfare," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    13. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/1lu2rbsv0n8pkqid81q0tfof3f is not listed on IDEAS
    14. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/713kqq1pgu80lr8fn0lsuuh8lf is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Himmels, Christoph & Kirsanova, Tatiana, 2013. "Escaping expectation traps: How much commitment is required?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 649-665.
    16. Haberis, Alex & Harrison, Richard & Waldron, Matt, 2014. "Transitory interest-rate pegs under imperfect credibility," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86335, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    17. Barthélemy, Jean & Mengus, Eric, 2018. "The signaling effect of raising inflation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 488-516.
    18. J. Scott Davis & Ippei Fujiwara, 2015. "Pegging the exchange rate to gain monetary policy credibility," Globalization Institute Working Papers 224, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    19. Jeffrey Campbell & Jacob Weber, 2021. "Discretion rather than rules: Equilibrium uniqueness and forward guidance with inconsistent optimal plans," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 41, pages 243-254, July.
    20. Chen, Xiaoshan & Kirsanova, Tatiana & Leith, Campbell, 2017. "How optimal is US monetary policy?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 96-111.
    21. Taisuke Nakata, 2018. "Reputation and Liquidity Traps," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 28, pages 252-268, April.
    22. repec:upd:utppwp:039 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Jean Barthelemy & Eric Mengus, 2017. "Credibility and Monetary Policy," Working Papers hal-01970733, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:174:y:2019:i:c:p:22-25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.