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A Prudent Central Banker

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  • Francisco J. Ruge-Murciá

    (International Monetary Fund)

Abstract

This paper studies the role of prudence in modern central banking. To that end, it relaxes the usual assumption of quadratic preferences and adopts instead an asymmetric preference specification whereby positive deviations from a target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative deviations. It is shown that prudence with respect to inflation (unemployment) reduces (increases) equilibrium inflation. The overall effect depends on the relative magnitude of the preference parameters and the conditional variances of inflation and unemployment. The implications of the model are examined using cross-section data from OECD countries. . Copyright 2002, International Monetary Fund

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco J. Ruge-Murciá, 2002. "A Prudent Central Banker," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 49(3), pages 1-7.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:imfstp:v:49:y:2002:i:3:p:7
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Fabián Gredig, 2007. "Asymmetric Monetary Policy Rules and the Achievement of the Inflation Target: The Case of Chile," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 451, Central Bank of Chile.
    2. Pierdzioch, Christian & Rülke, Jan-Christoph & Stadtmann, Georg, 2015. "Central banks’ inflation forecasts under asymmetric loss: Evidence from four Latin-American countries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 66-70.
    3. Qin, Ting & Enders, Walter, 2008. "In-sample and out-of-sample properties of linear and nonlinear Taylor rules," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 428-443, March.
    4. Doyle, Matthew & Falk, Barry, 2010. "Do asymmetric central bank preferences help explain observed inflation outcomes?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 527-540, June.
    5. Ruge-Murcia, Francisco J., 2004. "The inflation bias when the central bank targets the natural rate of unemployment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 91-107, February.
    6. Dolado Juan & Pedrero Ramón María-Dolores & Ruge-Murcia Francisco J., 2004. "Nonlinear Monetary Policy Rules: Some New Evidence for the U.S," Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(3), pages 1-34, September.
    7. Pierdzioch, Christian & Rülke, Jan-Christoph & Stadtmann, Georg, 2012. "On the loss function of the Bank of Canada: A note," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 155-159.
    8. Thanassis Kazanas & Apostolis Philippopoulos & Elias Tzavalis, 2011. "Monetary Policy Rules And Business Cycle Conditions," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 79(s2), pages 73-97, September.
    9. Tambakis Demosthenes N., 2009. "Optimal Monetary Policy with a Convex Phillips Curve," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-25, June.
    10. Gomes, Orlando, 2006. "Monetary policy and economic growth: combining short and long run macro analysis," MPRA Paper 2849, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. White, Halbert & Pettenuzzo, Davide, 2014. "Granger causality, exogeneity, cointegration, and economic policy analysis," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 178(P2), pages 316-330.
    12. Denise R. Osborn & Dong Heon Kim & Marianne Sensier, 2005. "Nonlinearity in the Fed's monetary policy rule," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(5), pages 621-639.
    13. Shawn Chen‐Yu Leu & Jeffrey Sheen, 2006. "Asymmetric Monetary Policy in Australia," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 82(s1), pages 85-96, September.
    14. Shen, Chung-Hua & Lin, Kun-Li & Guo, Na, 2016. "Hawk or dove: Switching regression model for the monetary policy reaction function in China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 94-111.
    15. Orlando Gomes, 2010. "Nonlinear Inflation Expectations and Endogenous Fluctuations," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 4(3), pages 263-280, November.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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