Optimal target zones: How an exchange rate mechanism can improve upon discretion
Using Krugman's (1991) target zone model, we find an explicit, sub-game perfect solution for a central bank wishing to stabilize the exchange rate given proportional costs of intervention. We demonstrate, however, that precommitment to narrower bands would yield a welfare gain - which provides a theoretical rationale for an Exchange Rate Mechansim (ERM). Numerical simulations suggest that the optimal currency band with precommitment via an ERM is only half as wide as that under discretion.
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- Paul R. Krugman, 1988.
"Target Zones and Exchange Rate Dynamics,"
NBER Working Papers
2481, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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"Target Zones and Interest Rate Variability,"
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- Lars E. O. Svensson, 1990. "Target Zones and Interest Rate Variability," IMF Working Papers 90/31, International Monetary Fund.
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- Cohen, Daniel & Michel, Philippe, 1988. "How Should Control Theory Be Used to Calculate a Time-Consistent Government Policy?," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 263-74, April.
- Lars E.O. Svensson, 1992.
"Why Exchange Rate Bands? Monetary Independence in Spite of Fixed Exchange Rates,"
NBER Working Papers
4207, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- E.O. Svensson, Lars, 1994. "Why exchange rate bands? : Monetary independence in spite of fixed exchange rates," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 157-199, February.
- Svensson, L.E.O., 1992. "Why Exchange Rate Bands? Monetary Independence in Spite of Fixed Exchange Rates," Papers 521, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Svensson, Lars E O, 1992. "Why Exchange Rate Bands? Monetary Independence in Spite of Fixed Exchange Rates," CEPR Discussion Papers 742, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
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