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The choice of exchange rate bands: balancing credibility and flexibility

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  • Cukierman, Alex
  • Spiegel, Yossi
  • Leiderman, Leonardo

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  • Cukierman, Alex & Spiegel, Yossi & Leiderman, Leonardo, 2004. "The choice of exchange rate bands: balancing credibility and flexibility," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 379-408, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:62:y:2004:i:2:p:379-408
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    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Frankel, Jeffrey A. & Fajnzylber, Eduardo & Schmukler, Sergio L. & Serven, Luis, 2001. "Verifying exchange rate regimes," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 351-386, December.
    3. Horn, Henrik & Persson, Torsten, 1988. "Exchange rate policy, wage formation and credibility," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(8), pages 1621-1636, October.
    4. McCallum, Bennett T, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central-Bank Independence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 207-211, May.
    5. E.O. Svensson, Lars, 1994. "Why exchange rate bands? : Monetary independence in spite of fixed exchange rates," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 157-199, February.
    6. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-286, March.
    7. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & van der Ploeg, Frederick, 1998. "Macroeconomic stabilization and intervention policy under an exchange rate band," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 339-353, April.
    8. Krugman, Paul & Miller, Marcus, 1993. "Why have a target zone?," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 279-314, June.
    9. Jacob A. Frenkel & Morris Goldstein, 1986. "A Guide to Target Zones," NBER Working Papers 2113, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 2019. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Credit and Capital Markets, Credit and Capital Markets, vol. 52(4), pages 505-525.
    11. Barro, Robert J., 1986. "Reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 3-20, January.
    12. Lindberg, H. & Svensson, L.E. & Soderlind, P., 1991. "Devaluation Expectations: the Swedish Krona 1982-1991," Papers 495, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    13. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1996. "Models of currency crises with self-fulfilling features," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 1037-1047, April.
    14. Edin, Per-Anders & Vredin, Anders, 1993. "Devaluation Risk in Target Zones: Evidence from the Nordic Countries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 161-175, January.
    15. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1997. "Destabilizing effects of exchange-rate escape clauses," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1-2), pages 61-77, August.
    16. Cukierman, Alex & Liviatan, Nissan, 1991. "Optimal accommodation by strong policymakers under incomplete information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 99-127, February.
    17. Svensson, Lars E O, 1991. "Assessing Target Zone Credibility: Mean Reversion and Devaluation Expectations in the EMS," CEPR Discussion Papers 580, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Rose, A.K. & Svensson, L.E., 1991. "Expected and Predicted Realignments: the FF/DM Exchange Rate during the EMS," Papers 485, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    19. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981.
    20. Lars E. O. Svensson, 1992. "An Interpretation of Recent Research on Exchange Rate Target Zones," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 119-144, Fall.
    21. Sutherland, Alan, 1995. "Monetary and real shocks and the optimal target zone," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 161-172, January.
    22. Miller, Marcus & Zhang, Lei, 1996. "Optimal target zones: How an exchange rate mechanism can improve upon discretion," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 20(9-10), pages 1641-1660.
    23. leiderman, L. & Bufman, G., 1996. "Searching for Nominal Anchors in Shock-Prone Economies in the 1990s: Inflation Targets and Exchange Rate Bands," Papers 15-96, Tel Aviv.
    24. Robert P. Flood & Peter Isard, 1989. "Monetary Policy Strategies," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 36(3), pages 612-632, September.
    25. Cukierman, Alex & Kiguel, Miguel A. & Liviatan, Nissan, 1992. "How much to commit to an exchange rate rule : balancing credibility and flexibility," Policy Research Working Paper Series 931, The World Bank.
    26. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1993. "Assessing target zone credibility : Mean reversion and devaluation expectations in the ERM, 1979-1992," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 763-793, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Barry Eichengreen., 1993. "International Monetary Arrangements for the 21st Century," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C93-021, University of California at Berkeley.
    2. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & van der Ploeg, Frederick, 1998. "Macroeconomic stabilization and intervention policy under an exchange rate band," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 339-353, April.
    3. Cukierman, Alex, 2008. "Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions -- Past, present and future," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 722-736, December.
    4. Huang, Haizhou & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2006. "Monetary policies for developing countries: The role of institutional quality," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 239-252, September.
    5. Galindo, Arturo J., 2000. "Estimating credibility in Colombia's exchange-rate target zone," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 473-484, December.
    6. Kocenda, Evzen, 2005. "Beware of breaks in exchange rates: Evidence from European transition countries," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 307-324, September.
    7. PKG HARISCHANDRA & George CHOULIARAKIS, 2008. "Do Exchange Rate Regimes Matter for Inflation Persistence? Theory and Evidence from the History of UK and US Inflation," EcoMod2008 23800100, EcoMod.
    8. Arturo José Galindo, 1999. "a credibilidad de la banda cambiaria en Colombia: implicaciones sobre el diferencial de tasas de interés," Coyuntura Económica, Fedesarrollo, June.

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