How much to commit to an exchange rate rule : balancing credibility and flexibility
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- Cukierman, Alex & Spiegel, Yossi & Leiderman, Leonardo, 2004.
"The choice of exchange rate bands: balancing credibility and flexibility,"
Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 379-408, March.
- Cukierman, Alex & Kiguel, Miguel A., 1993. "The Choice of Exchange Rate Bands: Balancing Credibility and Flexibiilty," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275572, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
- Cukierman, A. & Kiguel, M.A. & Leiderman, L., 1993. "The Choice of Exchange Rate Bands: Balancing Credibility and Flexibility," Papers 1-93, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
- Cukierman, Alex & Melnick, Rafi, 2015. "The Conquest of Israeli Inflation and Current Policy Dilemmas," CEPR Discussion Papers 10955, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ball, R., 1999. "The Institutional Foundations of Monetary Commitment: A Comparative Analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 27(10), pages 1821-1842, October.
- Fridman Alla & Verbetsky Aleksey, 2001. "Currency Substitution in Russia," EERC Working Paper Series 01-05e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
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Keywords
Economic Stabilization; Macroeconomic Management; Economic Theory&Research; Fiscal&Monetary Policy; Foreign Trade Promotion and Regulation;All these keywords.
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