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European competition policy modernization : from notifications to legal exception

Listed author(s):
  • Frédéric Loss

    (Laboratoire d'économétrie - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM])

  • Estelle Malavolti

    ()

    (LEEA - ENAC - Laboratoire d'Economie et d'Econométrie de l'Aérien - PRES Université de Toulouse - Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile)

  • Thibaud Vergé

    (Laboratoire d'Economie Industrielle - CREST-INSEE)

  • Fabian Bergès-Sennou

    (INRA - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA))

Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 came into force in May 2004 and replaced the mandatory notification of agreements by a regime of ex post monitoring. This paper shows that ex post monitoring is the optimal audit regime when the competition authority's probability of error is low. On the other hand, the notification system becomes optimal when the competition authority's probability of error is high. The paper also shows that block exemptions and black list (regimes of per se (il)legality) should be implemented when the agreements' expected welfare impact is very high and very low, respectively.

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File URL: https://hal-enac.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01021575/document
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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-01021575.

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Date of creation: Jan 2008
Publication status: Published in European Economic Review, Elsevier, 2008, 52 (1), pp 77-98. <10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.02.001>
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01021575
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.02.001
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-enac.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01021575
Contact details of provider: Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

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  1. Emons, Winand, 2003. "Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders," CEPR Discussion Papers 4131, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2000. "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," CEPR Discussion Papers 2349, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Besanko, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1993. "Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust Policy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 1-29, April.
  4. Emons, Winand, 2002. "Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders," CEPR Discussion Papers 3667, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., 1985. "Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, February.
  6. Petros C. MAVROIDIS & Damien J. NEVEN, 2000. "The Modernisation of EU Competition Policy : Making the Network Operate," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 00.17, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  7. Besanko, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1989. "Antitrust Enforcement under Asymmetric Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(396), pages 408-425, June.
  8. Barros, Pedro Pita, 2003. "Looking behind the curtain--effects from modernization of European Union competition policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 613-624, August.
  9. Picard, Pierre, 1996. "Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 27-56, December.
  10. David P. Baron & David Besanko, 1984. "Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 447-470, Winter.
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